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ABSTRACT 
Growing world-wide commitments and potential naval threats in the future 
will challenge the U.S. maritime forces to become more integrated and 
interoperable.  The Total Fleet Concept calls for a maritime force for the nation 
that essentially combines the assets and unique capabilities of each maritime 
agency available to the U.S. government and forms a scalable force that can be 
employed around the globe to accomplish missions in the national interest. 
The U.S. Navy is the preeminent maritime power in the world.  However, it 
has concentrated almost exclusively on maintaining its capability at the Blue-
water level of operations.  In light of the emerging asymmetrical threat from non-
peer competitor forces, the Navy has embarked on a stated program of building 
up its littoral and low-level regional capability in order to engage these 
adversaries in their own environment. 
This thesis studies the Navy’s budget requests of the Future Years 
Defense Program.  It also examines whether these budget requests and the 
long-range 30-year shipbuilding plan is leading to the transformational Fleet that 
is envisioned by the Total Fleet Concept, or is a continuation of the 
predominantly Blue-water operations focused Fleet and the assets that 
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The current force structure of the U.S. Navy is built around a global power 
projection model based on nuclear aircraft carrier strike groups or amphibious 
expeditionary strike groups.  Both compositions of naval forces include several 
classes of “Blue Water” ships, which are large, powerful, and expensive.  The 
common design background for nearly all combatants included in the U.S. Navy 
of the early 21st Century is that they were built for global operations against the 
now-defunct naval power of the former Soviet Union. 
The present environment that the U.S. Navy operates in lacks the large 
opposition force that it was designed to fight against.  Today’s enemy in the 
Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), in many cases, requires a naval force far 
different from the force that is the mainstay of U.S. naval power.  The Fleet 
requirements for future combat operations will need to be met by a fleet that is 
more scalable to the level of the threats faced by the U.S. 
From this idea of a scalable force, be it a current Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG), independently steaming frigate, or a 30’ river patrol boat, came the 
concept of an all-encompassing force which combines the assets and capabilities 
not only of the U.S. Navy, but the maritime assets of all agencies of the U.S. 
government.  The Naval War College, as part of its Strategic Studies Group XXIV 
report, put forth the Total Fleet Concept (TFC) as the roadmap towards a fully 
interoperable combination of all the maritime force capabilities within the U.S.  By 
standardizing training, platforms, equipment, procedures, and Command and 
Control protocols, the TFC’s goal is to improve operational agility while reducing 
unnecessary costs.1 
The operational commitments the Navy has in 2006 are no less than in 
years past, although the size of the Fleet is now 281 deployable battle force 
                                            
1 Naval War College Strategic Studies Group XXIV Quick Report, p. 94 
2 
ships,2 which is the smallest Navy Fleet since before World War II.  The TFC is a 
recognition of this fact and that the Navy will need to develop a new way of 
approaching its world-wide and homeland security responsibilities.  Resources to 
maintain the Navy’s coverage of all mission areas are under increasing pressure 
as the operational and procurement costs of transformation toward a new force 
rises continuously throughout all branches of the Department of Defense (DOD).  
The Navy can’t afford to waste resources on redundant systems or capabilities 
that can be found in other DOD branches and/or other Government agencies. 
The vision of the TFC is similar to Admiral Michael Mullen’s (Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO)) comments to the Surface Navy Association, 18th 
Annual National Symposium, held in Arlington, Virginia on January 10, 2006, 
relating on how to patrol the world’s oceans effectively in the future:   
"You may have heard me talk about the 1,000-ship Navy, about a world 
fleet of like-minded navies and coast guards teaming up in a sort of global 
neighborhood watch," CNO explained. "People realize our fates are lashed 
together now more so than at any other time in history."  
Mullen said he believes maritime cooperation must extend beyond this, 
and include outside agencies, governmental and nongovernmental, and the 
Navy's sister services, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard.3 
The TFC is a combination in the same vein as the 1000-ship Navy alluded 
to by ADM Mullen, although, the TFC applies the concept to a national fleet of 
maritime forces within the U.S.  The goal of the TFC is that if it floats, flies, 
submerges or operates in the maritime commons, it should be connected as one 
Total Fleet.4 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine what impact the pursuit of the 
Total Fleet Concept will have on future Navy budgetary vision as it follows either 
a traditional or transformational path to meeting the mission requirements for the 
next 30 years. 
                                            
2 Status of the Navy, 10 March 2006, www.chinfo.navy.mil 
3 CNO Speaks at SNA Symposium, www.navy.mil, Navy Newsstand, 11 Jan. 2006 (Last 
accessed Jan. 2006) 
4 Naval War College Strategic Studies Group XXIV Quick Report, p. 97 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
• To what extent do the FYDP in the next budget cycle and the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review lead towards the future Navy 
evolution to the Total Fleet Concept, to be implemented within the 
next 30 years, or are they a continuation of the traditional Blue-
Water Fleet? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What steps are necessary to implement the Total Fleet Concept? 
• Do the 2006 QDR and the FY 2007 30-year shipbuilding plan 
support a future vision of the TFC? 
• Is the National Fleet Policy a blueprint for the larger structure 
envisioned by the TFC? 
• Is there fiscal coordination between the U.S. Navy’s and the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s budget planning of future systems, and if so, is it a 
model for an expanded TFC program? 
• Do the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the USCG Deepwater cutter 
program complement each other or are they stovepipe 
developments within their respective services? 
• Is the Navy Expeditionary Combatant Command (NECC) Riverine 
Group a prototype for the new units required for the TFC? 
• How does implementation of force structure changes within the 
TFC affect stakeholders among the various agencies involved? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis examines and analyzes the known budget issues that could be 
affected by advancing the notion of the TFC.  There are endless paths that could 




this thesis focuses on the analysis of current programs and budget projections to 
determine if the TFC is feasible for the structure of the Navy over the next 30 
years. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Various research methods were used to acquire data and gain insight on 
the Navy’s future plans process.  The following methods were employed: 
1. Published Material Searches 
Multiple sources of published material were utilized to compile a database 
of background documentation and future projections, as they related to the 
implementation of programs that could evolve into the TFC.  Defense magazine 
and journal articles were a key source of background data and previous 
research, especially in the areas of Navy platform transformation and the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) program.  Internet sources 
were used to gather information and data from Government and government-
related research and analysis organizations.  The Congressional Research 
Service was a prime source of published reports on many aspects of current and 
future Navy mission and platform planning. 
2. Subject Matter Experts 
Several individuals, current and retired military, industry analysts, and 
Government researchers, were utilized for their in-depth knowledge of maritime 
programs budgeting issues concerning the Navy and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).  
Many are currently involved in research and reporting organizations which 
specialize in naval issue.  The primary means of data gathering from these 
individuals was via e-mail, although telephone discussions were used to get 
more specific details on particular items within their areas of expertise. 
3. Direct Documentation   
Contact was made with the Naval War College to obtain background 
information and research material that formed the basis for the TFC in the NWC 




F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Following this Introduction, Chapter II examines the National Fleet Policy 
and the current programs that are potential building blocks to that policy’s 
implementation.  Chapter III is a more in-depth analysis of the TFC and what it 
describes for the future fleet.  Chapter IV is an analysis of the budgeting impact 
of implementing the TFC.  Chapter V presents conclusions and 


































II. NATIONAL FLEET POLICY IMPACT  
A. REVIEW OF NATIONAL FLEET POLICY 
The Total Fleet Concept (TFC) has its origins in two policy directives put 
forth by the U.S. Government.  The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
(NSMS) was developed as part of National Security Presidential Directive 41, 
and the National Fleet Policy was published jointly by the Navy and U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG).  Both documents extol the philosophy that it is necessary for the 
country to defend its maritime interests with a multi-agency force of maritime 
assets available within the U.S.  The TFC is the future implementation of the 
NSMS and is an expansion of the National Fleet Policy beyond the scope of the 
Navy and the USCG, although, those Services will provide the predominance of 
the assets for the TFC. 
1. The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
The Total Fleet Concept (TFC) owes a great deal of its ideological roots to 
the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), approved by President Bush 
in September, 2005.  The theme of the TFC, to create a force of multiple DOD 
and other government maritime-capable agencies, is echoed in the NSMS.  The 
NSMS’s stated vision is to achieve maritime security for the people of the United 
States.  “Security of the maritime domain can be accomplished only by 
seamlessly employing all instruments of national power in a fully coordinated 
manner…Maritime security crosses disciplines, builds upon current and future 
efforts, and depends on scalable layers of security to prevent a single point of 
failure.”5  Within the NSMS, five strategic actions are called for to achieve the 
objective of US maritime security.  Of the five, the fourth strategic action, titled 
“Deploy Layered Security,” closely ties the NSMS to the common themes within 
the TFC, and provides substantial supportive relevance to the development of 
the TFC in the Navy’s future. 
                                            
5 National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD-41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-13), Dec. 21, 2004 
8 
The Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, 
and the Department of Justice, as well as the Department of State 
when diplomatic activities are required, will lead the United States' 
efforts to integrate and align all United States Government maritime 
security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive, cohesive 
national effort of scalable, layered security. This includes full 
alignment and coordination with appropriate State and local 
agencies, the private sector, and other nations.6 
The NSMS recognizes the importance of a broad spectrum of maritime 
forces drawn from the U.S. Armed Forces as well as national, regional, State, 
and even local law and regulatory enforcement agencies.  The Strategy defines 
the areas of concern for maritime security from the high seas to inland rivers, 
ports and waterways.  The foundations for the TFC can be found in the NSMS’s 
philosophy for integration of disparate maritime forces: 
• “Recognizing the critical importance of interoperability, maritime 
security actions at the operational and tactical levels will be based 
on a network-centric approach that employs resources, as needed, 
from multiple agencies - primarily from the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Defense – including 
surveillance and reconnaissance assets, aircraft, ships, boats, land 
units, and shore support facilities, all linked by an operational 
information network. 
 
• Wherever feasible and operationally effective, agencies should co-
locate in multiagency centers to facilitate direct interaction and 
efficient use of limited resources. Additionally, concrete and well-
defined coordination protocols and communication mechanisms 
including procedures for operating jointly to prevent  and respond to 
threats, and for assigning lead agencies for both pre- and post- 
incident operations, will be implemented. The coordination 
protocols must also outline defined procedures for ensuring 
national execution of maritime security policy for specific threats or 
incidents, and more routine encounters where a multiagency 
response must be seamlessly coordinated. 
 
• Integrated planning and effective management of agency resources 
- Federal, State, and local - are essential for an effective response. 
                                            
6 National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD-41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-13), Dec. 21, 2004 
9 
Therefore, agencies will also share training, planning, and other 
resources, where practical and permissible, to standardize 
operational concepts, develop common technology requirements, 
and coordinate budget planning for maritime security missions 
 
• Acquisition and logistics processes must support the continuous 
assessment of all requirements to optimize the allocation of 
appropriate resources and capabilities.  Cooperative research and 
development efforts, coupled with reformed acquisition processes 
with coordinated requirements, funding, and scheduling, along with 
management, will identify unmet and emerging needs.”7 
 
2. The National Fleet Policy 
Following the direction of the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the 
Navy and USCG have joined together to promulgate their own version of the 
coordination efforts described within the NSMS.  Evolving from its initial 
publication in 1998, the National Fleet Policy is the Navy and USCG’s jointly-
approved statement of direct support for the NSMS.  The Total Fleet Concept 
(TFC) again owes a great deal of its ideological roots to the National Fleet Policy.  
The National Fleet Policy Statement, as presented in Appendix A, is a joint policy 
agreement between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard to: 
coordinate, to the extent permitted under existing statutory 
authority, research and development, acquisitions, information 
systems integration, resource-ing, force planning, as well as 
integrated concepts of operations, intelligence and information, 
logistics, training, exercises, and deployments.  The Coast Guard 
and Navy will work together to plan, acquire and maintain forces 
that mutually support and complement each Service’s roles and 
missions.8 
The idea behind the National Fleet Policy is one which is meant to take 
advantage of the inherent strengths each Service brings to the table and 
combine them for a more capable force.  The intent of the National Fleet Policy is 
to broaden the asset base available to a Combatant Commander when faced 
                                            
7 National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD-41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-13), Dec. 21, 2004 
8 National Fleet: A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement, Mar. 3, 2006 
10 
with tactical situations that demand full flexibility and the application of the proper 
level of response using those forces at his disposal.   
The integration of capabilities between the Navy and USCG is meant to 
act as a force multiplier when the two forces combine their efforts.  In the 
operational arena, the Navy brings superior firepower, numerical strength in 
surface, air and subsurface units, and warfighting doctrine that spans the gambit 
from peacetime displays to global warfare against nation-state threats.  The 
USCG brings the statutory authority of law enforcement, environmental 
responsibility, and multi-mission tasking for numerous operations other than war, 
as well as a smaller-scale operational relationship with maritime forces 
worldwide. 
In order for the National Fleet Policy to function in practice, the policy 
statement directs the Navy and the USCG to develop and maintain 
complementary forces that can be called upon to assist the other Service when 
the mission need arises.  The key to this concept of mutual support is in the 
interoperability of the Navy and USCG in all mission areas, from peacetime 
operations, homeland security, crisis response and wartime tasks. 
Vital to the task of interoperability is the co-development of C4ISR 
(command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance) systems that will integrate the Command and Control nodes of 
each Service and tie their respective mission platforms into a coordinated 
network.  Along with the integration of a common Command and Control (C2) 
strategy, the National Fleet Policy strongly supports the maximum possible 
development of complimentary budget plans that will acquire assets that are 
mutually supportive of the individual and common goals of each Service’s roles 
and missions.  The Policy stresses the on-going acquisition of the Navy’s Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) program and the U.S. Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater 
System (IDS) as two programs that complement each other by joining the 
requirements of developed Navy capabilities with those of maritime law 
11 
enforcement and coastal defense.  The design and implementation of both 
programs is intended to maximize interoperability between the Services. 
The National Fleet Policy does not advocate the combination of the LCS 
and IDS programs.  The joint policy statement makes clear that the current 
position of each Service is that the two programs will pursue independent 
platform design and construction.  This is reasoned as a better way to support 
the industrial shipbuilding base and to encourage the options available for 
possible export markets for either the LCS or the various cutters included in the 
IDS plan.  The mission capabilities requirements that each Service desired also 
has led to incompatible Key Performance Parameters being developed for the 
LCS and the larger cutters of the IDS program. 
B. NAVY PROGRAMS 
The Navy has two major programs in progress during early 2006 that will 
be future contributors to the National Fleet Policy’s intent and stepping stones 
towards the ideas behind the TFC.  The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program of a 
new generation of small “brown water” combatants and the stand-up of the Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) and it’s newly formed Riverine Force 
fall within the blueprint for the TFC.  Both of these programs are designed for 
expansion beyond merely the Navy alone and as a group are positioned to 
become baseline units for consolidated maritime forces in the future. 
1. Littoral Combat Ship 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a radical departure from the traditional 
Navy platform development over the last 50 years.  Since the end of World War 
II, the Navy has increasingly concentrated on the development of surface units 
that are designed to support the carrier battle group concept of operations.  
Every major platform was designed and operated as a multi-mission platform 
capable of being integrated into the carrier-centric warfighting doctrine for large 
fleet “blue water” combat.  With two minor exceptions to this operational plan (the 




support PCs of the 1990s), all surface combatants which entered the Fleet, 
through the present day DDG-51 program, were designed as large, multi-
mission, open ocean vessels. 
Analysis of the capabilities that the Navy could deploy in response to 
maintaining coastal access in a hostile environment was conducted in 1998 by 
the Naval War College and the Naval Warfare Development Command.  A 
concept vessel known as the “Streetfighter” was hypothetically developed to 
advance the operational notion of a shallow water combatant that could perform 
mission tasks in a coastal environment that a present-day cruiser or destroyer 
would be inappropriate for.  After a three-year debate over the merits of such a 
combatant and its place in the Navy, the CNO announced that a restructuring of 
surface combatant acquisition would include a new small warship designed for 
focused, shallow-water missions, called the Littoral Combat Ship.9 
The LCS is intended to accomplish several identified missions where the 
Navy lacks strong shallow water capabilities.  Three mission areas have been 
identified as its initial priorities; however, the ship is designed to be mission 
reconfigurable to a much larger set of possible tasking.  The primary three 
mission areas are: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) 
against small boats, and mine warfare (MW).  As operational and tactical 
development progress, added mission areas will include, but are not limited to: 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) support, high-speed logistics transport, 
maritime intercept operations (MIO), intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR), and anti-terrorism/homeland security. 
The LCS program is designed around the concept of mission system 
modularity.  The ship itself is commonly referred to as a “seaframe,” much like an 
airborne asset is based on an airframe.  The seaframe is a core system which 
services the basic needs for a warship to function: hull/seaworthiness, command 
and control, launch and recovery systems, and self-defense systems, like the 
gun and radar.  The seaframe operations will be the responsibility of a core crew 
                                            
9 “Small Combat Ships and the Future of the Navy,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, www.csbaonline.org, Oct. 18, 2004 (Last accessed April 2006) 
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component.  The number of officers and sailors that will comprise the core crew 
is estimated to be 40 personnel.  Missions that can be accomplished by the core 
crew utilizing the seaframe alone are referred to as inherent missions.10 
The true concept behind the LCS is the mission package systems, called 
modules, which will customize the LCS for a focused mission area.  The initial 
mission package descriptions, as well as the inherent core missions, are 
contained in Appendix B11.  Mission modules are to be self-contained “plug and 
fight” systems that can be loaded on the LCS seaframe for whichever mission the 
ship is to be designated for.  Modules may consist of control and sensor 
containers that install into a mission bay onboard, or could consist of systems 
that will operate off-board from the LCS, which will serve as a “mothership” for 
various unmanned mission vehicles.  Due to the lack of a fully self-contained 
multi-mission configuration as part of the core seaframe, the key to battle space 
awareness will be accomplished via high-bandwidth connectivity with a wider 
battle network sensor net.   Lack of onboard sensors will then be made up for by 
the ability to “see” what the battle network sensor net sees.12 
Additional personnel associated with each mission module will join the 
core crew to complete the manning of the LCS.  Total combined crew size will be 
approximately 75 personnel.  In order to man the LCS in all necessary job skills, 
cross-training will be required of a majority of the crew members.  The term 
“hybrid sailor” has been coined to describe the multi-tasking sailors of the future 
LCS force.  In addition to the use of cross-training to reduce the total manpower 
requirement onboard, the Navy is investigating a manning augmentation system 
that will allow several administrative functions to be accomplished on shore and 
linked to the LCS crew via computer database.13 
                                            
10 GAO Report, GAO-05-255, “Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to 
Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships”, Mar. 2005 
11 Ibid 
12 “Small Combat Ships and the Future of the Navy,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments, www.csbaonline.org, Oct. 18, 2004 (Last accessed April 2006) 
13 “Littoral Combat Ship – Mix and Match”, Scott Truver, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Mar. 16, 
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Several off-board systems will be part of the mission module configuration.  
The most obvious off-board capability will be the provision for up to two 
helicopters, performing missions in support of all three of the initial mission 
packages.  Airborne mission functions can also be performed by the Fire Scout 
(RQ-8B) vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicles (VTUAV), which will 
complement or replace the helicopter contingent.  For ASuW, ASW, and MW, 
unmanned remote surface and subsurface vehicles are to be employed in 
various forms to increase the on-site tactical operational area and stand-off 
distance from potential threats. 
The acquisition plan for the LCS is split between two shipbuilders, each 
developing a separate version of the LCS (specifications in Table 1).  General 
Dynamics and Lockheed Martin each are to design and build two units under the 
initial Flight 0 procurement authorization (see Appendix D, Figures 4 and 5). 
Features General Dynamics14 Lockheed Martin15 
Hullform Trimaran Monohull 
Length 413 ft. 377 ft. 
Draft 14 ft. 13 ft. 
Displacement 2783 tons 3000 tons 
Top Speed 50 knots 56 knots 
Endurance (Sprint Spd) 1500 NM 1100 NM 
Endurance (Transit Spd) 4300 NM 3500 NM 
Mission Payload 210 tons 215 tons 
Hangar Space 2 MH-60 & 3 VTUAVs;    
H-53 Lndg Capable 
2 MH-60 or 1 MH-60 & 3 
VTUAVs 
Table 1.   LCS Design Comparison 
                                            
14 General Dynamics LCS website, www.gdlcs.com (Last accessed May 2006) 
15 Lockheed Martin LCS website, www.lmlcsteam.com (Last accessed May 2006) 
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Four units of the Flight 0 configuration are being built, with evaluations to be 
performed to determine design refinements as the Flight 1 procurement is 
commenced.  A determination on whether the Flight 1 and beyond units will be of 
one design or a continuation of the two separate designs has yet to be 
determined.  A spiral development plan will be used to make improvements 
throughout the procurement process and to add new technologies as they 
become viable.  Navy plans project a procurement of 56 LCSs by the completion 
of the program, although there are contingency discussions within the Navy that 
this number could be increased in later years, depending on whether the LCS 
mission set is expanded.16 
2. NECC - Riverine Force 
The new Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) officially stood 
up as of January 13, 200617.  The NECC is a combination of various commands 
that were spread throughout the Navy dealing with logistics, construction 
battalions (Seabees), coastal warfare small boat security units, and explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD).  To these units were added a totally new force, the 
creation of the Navy’s first riverine combat force since the Vietnam War. 
Riverine Group One is slated to be comprised of three squadrons of 12 
river combat boats each.  The Riverine Group will have approximately 700 total 
sailors assigned, who will be distributed across the three proposed squadrons.  
In naval warfare jargon, the Riverine Group will fill an operational gap in the 
Navy’s mission area coverage for the so-called “brown water” environment (“blue 
water/green water” being the operation environments of the open ocean and 
coastal regions.)  The riverine squadrons are intended for deployment to areas 
that are inaccessible to deeper draft warships, with missions including river 
patrol, troop transport, interdiction of illegal drug traffic, customs and law 
enforcement, control of river accessibility, and port security.  The first mission of 
the Riverine Group will be to replace the Marine Corps’ Small Craft Company, 
                                            
16 CRS Report for Congress, RS21305, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and 
Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, Mar. 6, 2006 
17 “Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Stands Up”, Katrina Scampini, Navy News 
Service, www.news.navy.mil, Jan. 14, 2006 (Last accessed Feb. 2006) 
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which is standing down after 2006.  Their current deployment includes river patrol 
on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, along with security patrols for various dams 
in Iraq.18 
The actual types of boats to be used for the Riverine Group have not been 
finalized yet.  Several options are being examined, including the small craft 
currently in use by the USMC (see Appendix D, Figure 11).  Projected cost of 
each craft is estimated to be $500,000 and they must be transportable using 
current airlift, such as the C-17. 
C. U.S. COAST GUARD’S INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM 
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the smallest branch of the U.S. armed 
forces, but is considered the 12th largest naval force, by number of ships, and the 
7th largest naval air force in the world.19  The USCG currently falls under the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for administrative control, however, it 
works closely with the DOD, and in time of war, will fall under the Navy’s 
operational control.  The National Fleet Policy strives to build stronger ties 
between the USCG and the Navy by mandating cooperation on future system 
development. 
The USCG has a wide array of missions assigned under its responsibility, 
both homeland and non-homeland maritime security, including ports and 
waterways and along coastlines, search and rescue missions, interdicting drug 
shipments and illegal aliens, enforcing fisheries laws, and responding to reports 
of pollution.  The main force of assets that the USCG currently has at its disposal 
consists of nearly 90 cutters of various sizes and capabilities and nearly 200 
aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters. 
In the midst of the post-9/11 world, the USCG is being tasked with more 
responsibilities to cover the growing homeland security mission.  Many of the 
assets that the USCG has are reaching the end of their projected service life.  
Both aircraft and surface platforms are suffering from increasing maintenance 
                                            
18 “As NECC Stands Up, Navy Prepares Riverine Forces for 2007 Iraq Mission”, Jason Ma, 
Inside the Navy, www.insidedefense.com, Jan. 23, 2006 (Last accessed Jan. 2006) 
19 “Coast Guard”, www.globalsecurity.org (Last accessed May 2006) 
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difficulties and the high costs of keeping the older platforms viable.  The age of 
some aircraft and surface ships are leading to their becoming unsupportable by 
the logistics supply chain.  Many of the parts to repair major systems are rapidly 
becoming scarce as the suppliers no longer manufacture them.20 
In order to halt the decline of the material condition of its deepwater assets 
the USCG has embarked on a recapitalization program called the Integrated 
Deepwater System (IDS).  It’s a 20-year plan with an estimated cost of between 
$19 and $24 billion.  The deepwater area of operations addressed by the IDS is 
typically defined as beyond the normal operating range, approximately 50 miles 
from shore.  The program is designed to replace legacy cutters with mostly new 
construction, while utilizing some present hulls with upgrades until the new 
cutters are budgeted fully and built.  The air component of the plan, likewise, 
replaces many systems and upgrades the most capable legacy aircraft.  New 
components added by the IDS will include unmanned aerial vehicles and a state-
of-the-art command and control network. 
Key to the success of the IDS is the replacement of the deepwater legacy 
cutters.  Three new classes of cutters are being designed and built to meet the 
scalable mission requirements of the IDS (see Appendix D, Figure 7): 
• National Security Cutter (NSC) – replaces High Endurance Cutters 
• Off-Shore Patrol Cutter (OPC) – replaces Medium Endurance Cutters 
• Fast Response Cutter (FRC) – replaces 110’ Patrol Boats 
A total of 90 new cutters are planned as the surface component of the IDS.  The 
first NSC is scheduled for operational delivery in mid-2007, while the OPC and 
FRC are still in various stages of the design approval and authorization process.  
Each new class of cutter will also be able to launch either of two new small IDS 
craft, the Long-Range Interceptor (LRI) or Short-Range Prosecutor (SRP).  
These small craft will be utilized for security and interdiction / boarding 
operations. 
                                            
20 GAO Report, GAO-05-757, “Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing 
Deepwater Legacy Asset Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition 
Challenges Remain”, July 2005 
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The IDS is also upgrading the USCG air capability.  New HC-130Js and 
upgraded HC-130Hs will maintain the long-range search mission, while a new 
aircraft, the CASA 235-300M21, is being acquired to take on the medium-range 
search mission.  The USCG helicopter force will be upgraded with new avionics 
systems and service life extensions and a new Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
program is being developed.  UAVs will be both high-altitude shore-based 
variants of the U.S. Air Force Global Hawk and a vertical take-off model for use 
on the NSC and OPC. 
All IDS platforms are to be networked via the USCG’s new C4ISR 
(command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance) system.  This network will link shore, surface, and air units in a 
common tactical information system.  Integration with the Navy and other 
government agencies is mandated under the IDS plan.22  
D. JOINT PROGRAMS / EXPERIMENTS 
Two joint programs are being developed specifically to fill common 
mission needs among the Services.  Sea Fighter is a Navy / Coast Guard 
program that represents new manning concepts with a mixed Service crew, as 
well as serving as a test-bed for new naval technology.  The Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV) is a joint Navy/Marine Corps/Army program which will provide the 
connector vessels for the sea base-to-shore link as part of the Navy’s Sea 
Basing concept within the Sea Power 21 vision, as well as provide a new theater 
logistics vessel for the Army. 
1. Sea Fighter 
The Sea Fighter (FSF-1) is a new class of up-to-now experimental ships 
known as Littoral Surface Craft.  It’s designed to be a test-bed for technology to 
be employed in future surface combatants, as well as a joint manning concept 
ship.  The Sea Fighter is a true joint crewed ship, with a Navy CO and a Coast 
Guard XO to lead a crew of 26 Navy and Coast Guard personnel. 
                                            
21 Built by the European Aeronautics Defense and Space Company’s (EADS) Spanish 
subsidiary Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA). 
22 Integrated Deepwater System, www.uscg.mil/deepwater (Last accessed May 2006) 
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The ship is a bridge between the LCS and the Riverine Force boats.  It 
has the capabilities and endurance similar to the LCS, and the shallow water 
draft and high speed capability to compliment the river patrol boats (see 
Appendix D, Figure 8).  Specifications for the Seafighter are as follows: 
 Length   267 ft 
 Draft    12 ft 
 Displacement  1600 tons 
 Engines   2 diesels and 2 LM-2500 gas turbines 
 Speed    55 knots 
 Helo Landing Spots  2 
 Cargo Capability  up to 12 mission containers 
 
Production cost of the single Sea Fighter vessel was approximately $65 million.  
It is configured to mirror many of the mission tasks that are part of the LCS 
program, albeit on a smaller scale.  A stern boat launch docking area is available 
for sending out a boarding team or an unmanned surface or subsurface craft for 
ASW, MW, or ASuW operations. 
The ship is another prototype for the TFC in that the joint crew has to be 
multi-task cross-trained and takes advantage of the skill sets that each Service’s 
personnel bring to the mission.  The model of a small, multi-tasked crew is 
applicable to the future LCS manning situation, in particular.23  
2. Joint High Speed Vessel 
The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program is a combination of 
previously independent programs run by the US Army and the Navy.  Both the 
Army’s Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and the Navy’s High Speed Connector 
(HSC) programs were developed to meet the same mission need: rapidly moving 
combat forces from a logistics base to a less accessible location by sea.  The 
primary feature of the JHSV is that it is a high-speed, shallow draft vessel with 
medium lift capability to transport conventional or Special Operations forces 
within a theater of operations. 
                                            
23 “New ‘Sea Fighter’ Ship Shakes Up American Admirals,” James Dunnigan, 
www.strategypage.com, July 21, 2005 & “Multitasking Is Rule of Road for Sea Fighter Crew”, 
Gidget Fuentes, Defense Daily, Aug. 22, 2005 & “Hull #S-144 – Sea Fighter”, 
www.nicholsboats.com (Last accessed Mar. 2006) 
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The JHSV is one of the components of the Navy’s Sea Basing concept 
and will be utilized to take personnel, equipment and material from the sea base 
platform to shore.  Its shallow draft feature will allow it to access shore facilities 
that larger expeditionary transport ships could not.  The JHSV will have a stern 
ramp for on/off-load of its cargo.  The ship will also have a large helo deck for 
airborne transport operations or utilization for alternate mission capabilities, such 
as Mine Warfare (MW). 
The Army, Navy and Marine Corps are leasing experimental versions of 
the JHSV from an Australian shipbuilder that specializes in high-speed 
catamarans used for car ferries (see Appendix D, Figure 6).  The Army is using 
the USAV Spearhead in the Persian Gulf for intra-theater logistics movements, 
while the Navy is operating the Joint Venture and Swift in support of experimental 
MW operations, as well as tsunami humanitarian assistance and Hurricane 
Katrina relief efforts.  The Marine Corps has gained experience at moving trial-
run expeditionary force elements in the western Pacific using the WestPac 
Express.24 
The JHSV platform capabilities can be utilized for large sealift loads.  The 
WestPac Express was able to transport 800 Marines, 60 ground vehicles, and 30 
gear storage containers from Okinawa to Yokohama, Japan in 30 hours.  Airlift of 
the same force could take up to 2 weeks, based on theater availability of Air 
Mobility Command assets.  The JHSV also reduced load and unload times in the 
area where the expeditionary force was ready to operate, rather than movement 
from an airfield or deepwater port facility. 
The JHSV “seaframe” could also be adaptable to many various missions, 
including MW Command and Control Center, Medical Support and Humanitarian 
Operations, and Anti-Terrorism/Homeland Security.  The large helo deck and 
stern launch well-deck, give the JHSV capabilities to support multiple 
government agencies in their maritime mission areas.25 
                                            
24 “US Sea Basing: Special Delivery”, Scott Truver, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Mar. 29, 2006 
25 “High Speed Vessel (HSV) Adaptability, Modularity and Flexibility for the Joint Force,” 
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Current acquisition of the JHSV program is headed up by the Navy’s 
Program Executive Office, Ships.  The Army will cover all operational costs of its 
vessels once they are procured and provide all personnel for the vessels that 
they control.  No plans are currently being pursued to operate the JHSV fleet as 
a jointly crewed vessel. 
E. THE NATIONAL FLEET POLICY AND THE TFC 
The National Fleet Policy as it stands is a cooperative agreement for the 
Navy and the USCG to operate together in the accomplishment of their missions.  
A form of the National Fleet Policy has been in effect long before the formal 
agreement was signed by the two Services.  There have always been strong ties 
between the Navy and USCG, as demonstrated by Navy participation in the 
USCG’s counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and USCG cutters supporting 
Navy 5th Fleet Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) in the Northern Arabian Gulf. 
The National Fleet Policy is already working in programs that enhance the 
interoperability of the USCG and the Navy.  The outfitting of USCG cutters with 
Navy Type/Navy Owned (NTNO) equipment enables the USCG to seamlessly 
join forces with the Navy when joint operations are necessary.  Future programs 
are being developed to equip and train the LCS and IDS cutters with common 
57mm gun systems and surface search radar systems. 
The TFC will take the National Fleet Policy to a broader level of interaction 
between not only the Navy and the USCG, but the full range of U.S. government 
agencies that operate in the maritime environment and participate in the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT).  The TFC will become a memorandum of agreement 
between all federal maritime agencies to provide mutual support and encourage 


































III. TOTAL FLEET CONCEPT  
A. TOTAL FLEET CONCEPT INDEPTH 
The Total Fleet Concept (TFC) is designed to address the problem posed 
by the fact that a single military service, the US Navy, can not fulfill all the 
capability and capacity requirements needed to address the full spectrum of 
future naval missions.  The Total Fleet must be capable of being applied across a 
broad spectrum of challenges that the nation may face in the future, from Major 
Combat Operations (MCO) to national Homeland Defense missions.  The TFC is 
an expansion of the current National Fleet Policy, taking it beyond the Navy and 
USCG, incorporating the other Department of Defense Services, as well as 
encompassing the maritime capabilities of other federal agencies. 
The TFC encompasses scalable forces to enable a combatant 
commander to deal with threats of any size.  The missions that the Total Fleet 
will be deployed against can be global in scope or can be down to interdiction of 
an individual person who has been identified as a threat.  The TFC is designed to 
operate beyond the role of combat-related missions in order to encompass all 
aspects of maritime security in the defense of the nation, including law 
enforcement, interdiction of contraband, maritime safety, and domestic and 
foreign disaster relief operations. 
The pursuit of the TFC may eliminate operational barriers to coordination 
between organizations and reduce the unnecessary costs associated with 
overlapping force capability.  Standardization may be possible in the areas of 
training, equipment, procedures, and Command and Control systems.26 
The current U.S. Navy Fleet has been designed, procured and trained as 
a major combat force intended to engage in peer-to-peer levels of operations in 
the open ocean, i.e. the “Blue-water Fleet” environment, and to conduct strike 
warfare at a nation-state target level.  In the arena of Major Combat Operations, 
                                            
26 “The Road to Total Fleet”, Strategic Studies Group XXIV working document, Naval War 
College, July 11, 2005 
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the U.S. Navy is practically unchallenged for dominance of the maritime battle 
space.  The decline of the naval forces of the former Soviet Union and 
unwillingness and/or inability of Russia to economically maintain its forces at 
Soviet-era levels, has left the power projection / nuclear aircraft carrier-oriented 
U.S. Navy without an adversary of comparable capability.  The growing Chinese 
navy is becoming a stronger regional force in eastern Asia, but is still, for the 
foreseeable future, a navy that will, at best, be a localized adversary.  The 
Chinese navy’s main combat power will reside in their submarine force and anti-
ship cruise missile capability, not in power projection and distant blue-water 
operations. 
In the Blue-water operational theater, the U.S. Navy is larger, by sheer 
warship tonnage, than the next 17 world navies…combined.27  The U.S. Navy 
has slowly reduced the number of vessels in the Fleet over the past 20 years 
since the Reagan era “600-ship” navy period, and currently has 281 battle force 
ships.28  This has not reduced the commitments that the Navy has been 
assigned and an increased operations tempo has been thrust upon it by the 
nature of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) / Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
and Enduring Freedom (OEF).  In this environment, it is still the dominant naval 
force in the world and fully able to fulfill its historical mission of maintaining sea 
lines of communication for commerce and power projection in order to benefit the 
nation. 
The Navy’s maintenance of the Major Combat Operations asset base is 
an ongoing process without compare in the world’s navies.  The CG-47 and 
DDG-51 classes, along with their follow-on platforms, DD(X) and CG(X), 
combined with the aircraft carrier and submarine force, are the dominant power 
projection warships in the world.  Even at a reduced numerical size compared to 
the Reagan-era build-up, the combat power of the present Fleet is much greater 
than the Fleet of 20 years ago.   
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brief, Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Mar. 1, 2005 


























(53 SSNs & 4 SSGNs) 
Table 2.   Aimpoint Capabilities of U.S. Fleet29 
 
Table 2 illustrates the impact of increased capabilities in the areas of aircraft-
launched precision guided weapons and surface and submarine Vertical Launch 
Systems (VLS).  These technological improvements enabled the Fleet to 
increase combat power while at the same time reduce the number of platforms 
necessary to employ that power.30 
The blue-water battle space is covered by the current Navy profile, 
however, that is not where the current threat resides.  The maritime threat 
associated with the GWOT does not fight on the open-ocean.  Other than 
operating within the transportation shipping realm, the enemy forces in the 
GWOT are resident in the littoral waters of belligerent or failed states, or in 
territorial areas of weaker host countries that do not have the resources to 
combat them.  Against this threat and within this operating environment, the U.S. 
blue-water fleet has little impact beyond the periphery.  The strengths of the U.S. 
Navy are usually only brought to bear in missions that approach the Major 
Combat Operations scenario:  Close Air Support (CAS) for ground forces and 
Direct Attack (DA), via manned aircraft or cruise missiles. 
The following graphic (Figure 1) depicts the new operating environment 
that the Navy finds itself in today.  The area of MCO is well taken care of by the 
                                            
29 “Winning the Race: A Naval Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy” 
brief, Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Mar. 1, 2005 
30 Other capabilities affected in the 1989 – 2006 timeframe:  Mine warfare capability has 
begun migrating to the Navy Reserve Force, as have several of the FFG-7s.  The FFG-7 class 
ships have had most of their surface-to-air missile capability removed, as well as consideration 
for removing the 76mm gun.  Logistics ships were almost entirely transferred to the Maritime 
Sealift Command and designated as USNS ships.  Amphibious forces remained roughly equal 
over the period. 
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current Blue-water Fleet assets.  The three warfare areas where the Navy is not 
very well balanced are in Stability Operations, GWOT, and Homeland Security 
(HLS).  By nature, they are all in the littoral, falling into the coastal (“Green-
water”) and interior (“Brown-water”) maritime operating areas. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Navy Warfighting Areas31 
 
The assets of the current naval force are not positioned well to combat the 
GWOT threat.  Part of the method to combat the world terrorist threat is to build 
relationships with allies that can assist in the war effort.  The primary surface 
force combatants in the Fleet are not suitable to form close liaison relationships 
with the navies of friendly host nations.  Many nations would like to operate and 
train with U.S. forces, however, the U.S. Navy’s level of operations far exceed 
the capabilities of the nations that wish to conduct exercises with it.  To alleviate 
this mismatch of capability level, the USCG has been utilized in the role of a 
peer-force provider when working with friendly nations whose naval forces are on 
a much smaller scale than even the smallest NATO-level navy. 
In order to combat the array of threats that will present themselves in the 
next 20-30 years, the Navy will have to provide presence in the areas where the 
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threat resides.  In a forward projecting strategy, naval forces must be on-scene to 
combat or preempt the threat.  Forward presence is the key to establishing the 
working relationships that will be necessary for the U.S. forces to be able to 
maintain access in threat regions. 
The TFC moves U.S. maritime forces into the littoral regions where the 
Navy is now lacking strong capabilities.  By leveraging the capabilities of all 
organizations the nation has at its disposal, the future combatant commanders 
will be able to apply the force necessary to meet the threats they face in their 
operational region. 
The Navy itself is moving towards a broader capability with the 
introduction of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) (Appendix D, Figures 4 and 5).  
The LCS has been designed to operate in the shallow-water, coastal 
environment, however, it is still basically an extension of the Blue-water Fleet.  At 
3,000 tons, the LCS is still twice the size of many potential allied nations’ largest 
corvette.  In many respects, through the swapping of modular mission packages, 
the LCS is a slightly smaller replacement for the Perry-class guided-missile 
frigates (FFG-7).  As the FFG-7 class is retired in the coming years, there will be 
pressure to utilize the LCS as a one-for-one replacement for the missions 
currently covered by the FFG-7s.  The LCS alone is not the final answer to the 
Navy’s entry into the littoral zone of operations.   
The area in the TFC where the LCS still does not provide coverage is in 
the littoral region requiring smaller vessels.  The USCG’s Integrated Deepwater 
System (IDS) program is a model for the various platforms necessary to cover 
the changing levels of littoral operations.  The USCG as a military service is 
designed as a littoral force.  The combination of assets via the TFC will bring in 
the USCG’s capabilities and the coverage provided by the IDS model.  A 
comparison of the complimentary nature of the Navy and USCG forces as the 
battle-space is moved closer to the shore is contained in Figure 2.  The USCG, 
with its many various sized vessels, provides broad coverage of the littoral  
operational zone.  The Navy is bracketing both ends of the littoral spectrum with 
28 
the LCS and the Riverine Group in the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 
(NECC). 
 
Figure 2.   Future Mix of Major Navy and USCG Platforms32 
 
In order to achieve the TFC for U.S. maritime forces within the next 20-30 
years, coordination must be planned between the various maritime forces.  The 
TFC is not just a combination of naval assets to create a numerically larger force.  
The TFC is a process for leveraging the capabilities that exist or will exist shortly 
to produce economies of scale across the maritime Services.  The TFC is based 
on the ideas of developing common systems and procedures, as well as 
integrating training and personnel among the different maritime Services.  The 
process to achieve this goal of integration of forces will take the next 20-30 years 
                                            
32 Adapted from “Navy 2035”, Strategic Studies Group XXIV working brief, Naval War 
College, slide 32 
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to be fully accomplished.  Organizational transformation will have to performed in 
phases and be limited to realistic milestones along the way.   The timetable for 
the TFC process will be re-visited later in this chapter. 
B. ROADMAP TO TOTAL FLEET CONCEPT 
How many assets does the United States have in its maritime inventory?  
The TFC at its core is a force larger than the U.S. Navy alone.  If the Navy was 
able to fund and build all the assets, in all different sizes and capabilities, then 
there would be no need for a cooperative force under the TFC umbrella.  Beyond 
the Navy, a large number of maritime assets exist that are potentially at the 
disposal of a combatant commander under a TFC force.  The question is: what 
are all the assets currently or in the planned future of the U.S. maritime forces? 
1. Navy Assets 
The U.S. Navy is the prime asset base force for the foundation of the TFC.  
It is one of the three major branches of the U.S. Armed Forces and has a FY 
2006 budget of $122.9 billion33.  This provides for a very large infrastructure as 
well as the necessary procurement for maintaining the largest combat fleet in the 
world.  The previously cited size of the U.S. Navy, in terms of battle force ships, 
is 281 vessels.  The Chief of Naval Operations formally submitted a plan to 
Congress for a future naval force structure of 313 battle force ships as an 
accompaniment to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.  The target timeframe 
for achievement of the 313-ship force structure is to be less than 15 years into 
the future: FY 2020.34  The 313-ship breakdown (with the current Fleet 






                                            
33 “Department of Navy 2007 Budget Submission”, PPT brief presented by RADM Stan 
Bozin, Director, Office of Budget, Office of the Assist. Secretary of the Navy; Financial 
Management and Comptroller,  Mar. 2, 2006, slides 3 & 5 
34 “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 
2007”, Department of the Navy, Feb. 2006 
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Submarines  72 66  
     Ballistic Missile Submarines 
(SSBNs)  
     14      14  
     Cruise Missile Submarines 
(SSGNs)  
       4        4  
     Attack Submarines (SSNs)       54      48  
Surface Combatants  100 143  
     CGs/CG(X)s       22      19  
     DDGs/DDG(X)s       48      62  
     DD(X)s         0        7  
     FFG-7s       30        0 
     Littoral Combat Ships        0      55 
Expeditionary Warfare Ships  36 43  
     Amphibious Landing Ships       36      31 
     Future Maritime Prepositioning 
     Ships MPF(F)         0      12 
Combat Logistics Force Ships  29 30  
Support Vessels  32 20  
Total Ship Battle Force (TSBF)  281 313  
Table 3.   Future Naval Force Structure35 
The 313-ship force structure does not take into account the entire U.S. 
Navy vessel count when determining the battle force numbers.  The 313-ship 
force is representative of the Navy’s Blue-water operations requirements.  The 
LCS is a major portion of the surface combatant totals, however, one of its 
primary mission areas is Mine Warfare (MW) and a secondary is Special 
Operations Patrol and Support.  Leading up to the realization of the 313-ship 
force, there are still eight dedicated MW vessels in the Fleet36 as well as up to 13 
Cyclone-class patrol craft (see Appendix D, Figure 13).  The newly established 
                                            
35 Fleet Size, Naval Vessel Register, www.nvr.navy.mil, Apr. 10, 2006 (Last accessed May 
2006) and  “The 313-Ship Fleet and the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan”, Robert O. Work, 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Mar. 30, 2006, Adapted from Figure 1, p. 2 
36 “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 
2007”, Department of the Navy, Feb. 2006, Table 5 
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Riverine Group One will have three squadrons of 12 river combat patrol vessels, 
also (Appendix D, Figure 11). 
The TFC is by definition a scalable force structure, covering the war 
fighting battle space from the Blue-water to the Brown-water area.  By taking into 
account the Navy’s spread of combat capability as envisioned by the TFC, the 
Navy’s true contribution to the TFC is approximately 360 vessels.  Inclusion of 
numerous small patrol craft that are part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat 
Command’s (NECC) Naval Coastal Warfare Groups and the Special Operations 
Command (20 82’ Mk V Special Operations Craft) could theoretically push the 
Navy’s total over 400 vessels. 
2. Coast Guard Assets 
The USCG is the smallest of the U.S. Armed Forces and actually falls 
under the managerial control of the Department of Homeland Security, rather 
than the Department of Defense (in wartime, the USCG does become 
operationally subordinate to the Navy37.)  The USCG was budgeted at $8.1 
billion for FY-06, of which $944 million was allocated for the Integrated 
Deepwater System (IDS) re-capitalization program38.  The IDS program is 
estimated to cost between $19-24 billion over a 20-25 year period39.  The IDS 
program is slated to replace 93 aging cutters and replace or modernize 207 
maritime aircraft.  The surface ship procurement planned for the IDS program is 
shown in Table 4. 
In addition to the platforms directly affected by the IDS program (Appendix 
D, Figure 7), the USCG currently has 65 additional patrol boats that are of recent 
construction and not covered in the Deepwater plan.  These 87’ Coastal Patrol 
Boats are stationed throughout the U.S. as local area patrol, safety, and law 
enforcement vessels.  Their mission and capability contribute to the USCG’s 
                                            
37 Factfile – National Defense, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/index.htm (Last 
accessed Apr. 2006) 
38 “U.S. Coast Guard 2007 Budget in Brief “, www.uscg.mil, Feb. 2006 (Last accessed May 
2006) 
39 CRS Report for Congress, RS21019, “Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and 
Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, Jul. 22, 2005 
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mission in the TFC and are also included in Table 4.  Not included in the Table 4 
numbers, but still part of the IDS program are the small boat Long Range 
Interceptors and Short Range Prosecutors.  These craft are being procured for 
carriage onboard the National Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters.  
Other vessels not included in the totals are the USCG’s icebreakers, buoy tender 
ships, and several hundred smaller, coastal search and rescue boats.  The 
combined total of significant USCG surface assets, for the TFC, numbers 156 
vessels.  This could be increased by the most capable 372 fast, sea-going small 
boats for a grand total of 528 vessels. 
    
Platform Type Quantity 
Deepwater National Security Cutters 8 
Deepwater Offshore Patrol Cutters 25 
Deepwater Fast Response Cutters 58 
Legacy Coastal Patrol Boats 65 
Total 156 
Table 4.   USCG Future Force Structure; Deepwater and Legacy40 
 
3. Army Assets 
The U.S. Army would not normally come to mind as a segment of the U.S. 
Armed Forces with assets to add to the TFC.  In fact, the U.S. Army has a large 
force of vessels focused on amphibious warfare and watercraft logistics in 
support of theater operations.  Much of the Army’s waterborne forces are 
designated for the movement and sustaining of equipment from strategic sealift 
 
 
vessels to ashore combat forces.  The Army’s watercraft fleet is comprised of 79 
                                            
40 CRS Report for Congress, RS21019, “Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and 
Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, Jul. 22, 2005 and data from www.uscg.mil/datasheet 
(Last accessed May 2006) 
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named vessels, divided among Logistics Support Vessels, tugs, and Landing 
Craft Utility boats41.   
While not a direct collection of assets to be included in the TFC, the Army 
Watercraft program is going through a restructuring period and will be replacing 
many older logistics vessels with a fleet of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) 
(Appendix D, Figure 6).  The TFC will benefit from the inclusion of these JHSV 
assets since they are ideally designed to compliment other maritime assets in the 
littoral combat environment.  They will make the connection from a Green-water 
arena to a Brown-water operation.  They will also be in a position to perform as a 
jointly manned asset, operating as like assets to Navy and USMC versions of the 
JHSV.  Army plans are for the acquisition of approximately 20 JHSVs42. 
4. Other Federal Agency Assets 
Maritime assets available to the TFC are not limited to the Navy, Army, 
and Coast Guard.  Border security, law enforcement, and oceanic surveillance 
are vital missions for the Total Fleet, whether pre-hostility reconnaissance or 
observations made to enforce national policies dealing with U.S. sovereignty 
and/or economic threats.  The USCG has been the lead federal agency for 
border security within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  As a 
military, maritime, multi-mission service, the USCG has all the assets and 
resources associated with a world-class naval service, but they are not the only 
agency within DHS with assets to provide to the TFC. 
The Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) has both air and maritime assets 
that are all dedicated to border security and the prevention of terrorist acts or 
infiltration.  In a consolidation effort, as of October 2004, the air and maritime 
assets from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division were combined 
with the units of the Office of Border Patrol division to form a single reorganized 
division called CBP Air and Marine.  CBP Air assets number 250 aircraft, 
including P-3 Airborne Early Warning aircraft and H-60 Blackhawk helicopters, 
                                            
41 Army Vessels Registry, Office of Chief of Transportation, Ft. Eustis, Virginia, Mar. 6, 2006 
42 “Theater Support Vessel Program”, www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/tsv (Last 
accessed Apr. 2006) and conversations with Mr. Ray Aube, Army Watercraft Branch Chief, 
Material Systems Directorate, CASCOM, Apr. 17, 2006 
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making the CBP the largest law enforcement air force in the world.  CBP Marine 
has 200 vessels of various types (Appendix D, Figure 12), from small powered 
utility boats to 39’ high-speed Midnight Interceptors used to interdict so-called “go 
fast” boats favored by drug smugglers.43 
The operating environment for the CBP Air and Marine is within the 
coastal littoral and interior riverine zone.  Its state-of-the-art communications and 
highly mobile tactical units form a coordinated force with close ties to other 
federal, state, and local military and law enforcement agencies.  As part of the 
TFC, the CBP provides a large force to be utilized as a force multiplier in 
conjunction with the Navy and USCG in the homeland security/defense mission.
 Some non-military government agencies are participants in the maritime 
environment, even without a force of dedicated maritime assets.  The US Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) is active in the prevention of illegal drugs from 
entering the US, from land, air, and sea access points.  The DEA occasionally 
operates marine craft that have been acquired through the confiscation of assets 
utilized for illegal trafficking.  In the context of being participants in the TFC, their 
use of occasionally available maritime assets does not constitute a notable 
contribution, however, the DEA works in local coastal regions with both the 
USCG and the CBP.  DEA officers who have trained with the local USCG and 
CBP units are sent on detachments for specific operations in order to augment 
their law enforcement personnel.  In this capacity, their personnel are part of the 
TFC framework of coordinated agencies.  Future growth for the Navy in the 
homeland security mission area will likely require the Navy to coordinate with 
non-maritime related agencies, such as the DEA.44 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a 
maritime organization committed to oceanic surveying and research data 
collection.  In the TFC, the NOAA fleet would add an additional 20 vessels 
dedicated to ocean patrol that would be networked with the other U.S. maritime 
                                            
43 CBP Air and Marine Overview, www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/air_marine (Last 
accessed May 2006) 
44 Phone interview with Mr. Steve Robertson, Public Affairs, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Apr. 17, 2006 
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forces and would be eligible to provide surveillance data contributing to 
homeland defense in non-combat areas, such as economic resource protection.  
NOAA vessels are open-ocean vessels with an average of 40 days endurance 
(Appendix D, Figure 10).  The NOAA ships are commanded by a commissioned 
officer corps, under the Department of Commerce, however, they are considered 
members of the U.S. Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency.45 
5. Combined Total Fleet 
The TFC leverages the quantity and capabilities of a broad base of 
maritime assets available to the nation.  Each service has invested in a fleet of 
vessels that are specifically designed to meet its organization’s specific needs.  
The Navy and USCG have invested in numerous platforms that address the 
multi-mission nature of their operational requirements.  The Army, CBP and 
NOAA have very specific purposes for the maritime assets that each of those 
organizations have developed.  As a combined force, the totals of all these 
maritime assets provides a vast capability if they were effectively coordinated into 
one force under the TFC.  Table 5 presents the theoretical totals for the various 
DOD and non-DOD government agencies that would contribute assets to the 








Table 5.   Potential Total Fleet Vessel Count 
  
6. Timetable for Total Fleet 
The adoption of the TFC as the operational structure of the U.S. maritime 
forces will not happen overnight.  Many coordination evolutions will have to be 
put in motion in order to transform the nature of mission accomplishment by the 
                                            
45 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Marine and Aviation Operations 
website, www.omao.noaa.gov, (Last accessed Mar. 2006) and information utilized from the 
“Report of NOAA’s Ship Platform Requirements FY03-FY12,” Powerpoint Brief presented by CDR 
E.A. White (NOAA Ret.), Oct. 6-7, 2004 
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varied maritime forces that will be available to a future combatant commander.  
Three general areas of symmetry can be viewed as the roadmap to the TFC 
becoming the backbone of maritime force application.  These include: Common 
Systems, Common Processes, and Personnel Integration.  Figure 3 is a charting 
out of the paths and estimated time table for accomplishment of theoretical 
phases of implementation, through the year 2025. 


















Expand Common   
Systems to Federal 
Maritime Agencies 
Begin Alignment of 
USN/USCG/USA/DHS 
Processes 
•Adopt Common   
Processes for Other 
Federal Maritime 
Agencies
Start integration of  
USN/USCG/USA/DHS
• Training   
• Personnel
• Achieve Integration of 
USN/USCG/USA/DHS
• Initiate Integration with 
Other Agencies
 
Figure 3.   Total Fleet Roadmap46 
 
First, Common Systems will enable the forces of the TFC to operate within 
a familiar environment of equipment and functionality.  Not every system needs 
to be replicated by each Service (e.g. the USCG does not require integration with 
the Virginia-class submarine program,) however, many similar systems are 
necessary for each Service to perform its missions.  Various vessels, aircraft, 
certain weapons systems, and definitely communications equipment are all areas 
that need to evolve into common systems across the Services. 
                                            
46 “The Road to Total Fleet”, Strategic Studies Group XXIV working document, Naval War 
College, July 11, 2005, adapted from graphic on p. 1 
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Common Processes addresses the merging of procedural tasks within 
each Service in order to ease cross-Service coordination.  By aligning common 
acquisition and logistics programs when duplicative efforts are underway, the 
Services can benefit from coordinating the activity and achieve either, savings on 
the program, or be able to acquire greater numbers for the same cost, through 
the economies of scale created by larger scope programs. 
Personnel Integration will build the interoperability of the various Services 
when called upon to deploy for the same mission or operate as a joint unit on a 
common platform.  Training in many specialties is often duplicated by each 
Service, including non-military government agencies.  Economies of scale again 
come into play when these common training tasks are merged to not only 
eliminate duplicated efforts, but to form a common knowledge base between the 
personnel when utilized in a future TFC multi-Service environment. 
C. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was released on February 
6, 2006.  It is the first QDR to be influenced by the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 and written to address the post-9/11 world situation.  The 2006 QDR 
also comes as the nation is continuing to prosecute the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The QDR’s purpose is to anticipate the needs of the U.S. Armed 
Forces for the next two decades and provide a guide to near-term procurement 
decisions about the size, shape and capabilities of the U.S. military.  As stated in 
the QDR: 
 “This QDR defines two fundamental imperatives for the Department of 
Defense: 
 
• Continuing to reorient the Department’s capabilities and forces to be more 
agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges and to 
hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years. 
 
• Implementing enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational 
structures, processes and procedures effectively support its strategic 
direction.”47 
 
                                            
47 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 1 
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The 2006 QDR impacts the military Services and their future design by 
addressing several of the programs that will carry each Service into the next 20 
year timeframe.  The foundation of these future forces and capabilities will be put 
forth in the budget requests forwarded from the Department of Defense, starting 
with the FY 2006 input to the FY 2007 Presidential Budget Request.  The plans 
addressed by the QDR are intended for the budget processes to be carried out 
over the FY2008-2013 FYDP. 
The QDR pertains to the future TFC in many ways.  Joint operations and 
interoperable forces are a continuous theme throughout the report.  Directly 
related to the TFC and its philosophy of inter-Service and inter-agency 
cooperation, the QDR emphasizes that the way to achieve the strategic goals of 
the U.S. Armed Forces is to work together with other organizations and combine 
efforts necessary to combat the nation’s threats.  As stated in the 2006 QDR 
report: 
As set forth in the Defense Department’s National Maritime Security 
Policy and in the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 
the Department’s strategic goal for homeland defense is to secure 
the United States from direct attack. To achieve this goal, the 
Department will work as part of an interagency effort, with the 
Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, state and 
local agencies, to address threats to the U.S. homeland.48 
 
In the maritime approaches, the Department works alongside the 
Department of Homeland Security to integrate U.S. maritime 
defense – optimizing the mutually supporting capabilities of the 
U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. Forward deployed naval 
assets work with other agencies to identify, track, and intercept 
threats before they threaten the United States.49 
 
Overall, consistent with the National Maritime Security Policy and 
the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, defending 
the homeland in depth and mitigating the consequences of attacks 
highlight the need for the following types of capabilities:  
                                            
48 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 25 
49 Ibid. p. 26 
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• Joint command and control for homeland defense and civil support 
missions, including communications and command and control 
systems that are interoperable with other agencies and state and 
local governments.”50 
 
The concept of interoperability resonates in the entire QDR report.  Lastly: 
 
 Just as the Second World War posed immense challenges 
that spurred joint and combined operations within the military, 
today’s environment demands that all agencies of government 
become adept at integrating their efforts into a unified strategy.  
This requires much more than mere coordination: the Department 
must work hand in glove with other agencies to execute the 
National Security Strategy.51 
 
In the area of direct support for the TFC, the QDR is more ambiguous 
about specific actions necessary to build a maritime force as envisioned by the 
TFC.  Several key issues are addressed that do support the future force structure 
of the TFC.  Early on in the report’s assessment of the methods to continue the 
GWOT fight, the need for the Navy’s new riverine force is defined in terms of a 
force necessary to deny terrorist use of river waterways.52   
The USCG is brought up repeatedly as a force with which the Navy will 
coordinate integrated operations.  A specific point is made as the opening to the 
Joint Maritime Capabilities section: 
 Joint maritime forces, including the Coast Guard, will 
conduct highly distributed operations with a networked fleet that is 
more capable of projecting power in the “brown and green waters” 
of coastal areas. They will be capable of projecting force and 
extending air and missile defenses from far greater ranges. Coast 
Guard and naval capabilities will be fully integrated. Undersea 
capabilities, both manned and unmanned, will use stealth, 
survivability, endurance, payload size and flexibility to complicate 
potential foes’ planning efforts and strengthen deterrence.53 
                                            
50 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 27 
51 Ibid. p. 83 
52 Ibid. p. 24 
53 Ibid. p. 47 
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Not only does the QDR support integration with the USCG, but it identifies 
the littorals (“brown and green waters”) as an area where power projection is 
needed.  The network concept of the Littoral Combat Ship’s Command and 
Control employment vision and its future mission capability of unmanned craft 
are also addressed in the QDR concept of Joint Maritime operations.  The QDR 
recognizes the comparison of the LCS to the USCG Deepwater program: 
 The Navy is rapidly developing and fielding the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) to provide an advanced littoral warfare 
capability. The Coast Guard is recapitalizing its deepwater ships 
and improving its ability to conduct joint operations with the Navy.54 
The QDR indirectly references the Navy’s 313-ship future force structure 
plan.  The numerical total of 313 ships is never stated in the QDR, however, it 
does emphasize that the Navy will build a larger fleet.  The Navy’s QDR 
decisions include:   
• “Build a larger fleet that includes 11 Carrier Strike Groups, balance 
the need to transform and recapitalize the fleet, improve 
affordability and provide stability for the shipbuilding industry. 
• Accelerate procurement of Littoral Combat Ships to provide power 
projection capabilities in littoral waters. 
• Procure the first eight ships of the Maritime Pre-Position Force 
(Future) to improve the Department’s ability to operate in restricted 
access environments. 
• Provide a Navy riverine capability for river patrol, interdiction and 
tactical troop movement on inland waterways. 
• Return to a steady-state production rate of two attack submarines 
per year not later than 2012 while achieving an average per-hull 
procurement cost objective of $2.0 billion.”55 
                                            
54 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 48 
55 Ibid. p. 48 
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The maintaining of 11 Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) actually takes into account 
the desired retirement of the USS John F. Kennedy in 2006, which would reduce 
the number of aircraft carriers in the Fleet to 11.  With the endorsement of the 
QDR for the 11 CSG force, the submitted President’s Budget for 2007 reflects 
the same number for carrier force funding.56 
The QDR policies reviewed are in line with the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security and strongly supportive of the National Fleet Policy, through 
several statements striving for a greater cooperative effort with the USCG.  The 
QDR fully recognizes that the DOD cannot meet all of the challenges faced by it 
in the current and future timeframe without integration and close coordination 
with all U.S. Government agencies.  The baseline proposals of the TFC are firmly 
supported by the language of the QDR.  Standardization of concepts, compatible 
technology and equipment, coordinated planning and deployment of forces, and 
integrated training consolidation are all areas that are identified in the QDR and 
play to the strengths of the TFC for a future maritime force.   
The Navy will clearly have to maintain and continue development of its 
own necessary capabilities to carry out its mission objectives.  While the 
traditional roles and missions of the Navy still come first, the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS), the Riverine Group, and the recapitalization of the entire surface 
combatant force are ongoing programs that will add to the flexibility of the Navy 
force structure.  The TFC takes advantage of these growing capabilities within 
the Fleet and amplifies them for a broader, scalable capability.  The TFC does 
not alleviate the Navy’s requirement for maintaining current force structure, with 
the capabilities to fight at the Major Combat Operations level versus an 
adversarial nation state, and exploring new force capabilities in order to field 
sufficient maritime presence in the future.  The assessment of the U.S. maritime 
forces currently available for the TFC shows a force structure over 1100 vessels 
strong.  In order to maintain and upgrade the Navy’s contribution to the TFC, the  
 
                                            
56 FY 2007 President’s Budget, Department of the Navy, 
http://public.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/07pres-Section_II.pdf, Feb. 2006 (Last accessed Feb. 2006) 
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Navy’s near-term budget plans and long-term shipbuilding plans must be 
examined for their feasibility and contribution to the transformational concept of 



















IV. ANALYSIS OF BUDGET IMPACT ON THE TFC 
A. CURRENT FORCE BUDGET PLAN 
As previously referenced in Chapter III, the current size of the Navy battle 
force stands at 281 ships.57  This level of force size has been a growing concern 
for both the Navy and the Congress, as it affects the ability of the Navy to 
successfully carry out its missions and the effect it has on the country’s 
shipbuilding industrial base.  The goal of establishing a base Fleet size of 313 
ships has been the Navy’s response to the need to arrest the decline in the 
number of ships and provide stability to the shipbuilding industry.  The Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mullen, has stated that he would be “very 
uncomfortable…very concerned” if the Fleet strength slipped to less than the 281 
ships in the current force.58 
Building on the FY 06 Navy budget request and progressing though the 
FY 07 through FY 11 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the Navy is putting 
forth the plan to build the Fleet towards the 313-ship level.  The Total Fleet 
Concept (TFC), while leveraging the capabilities of many agencies in the U.S. 
government’s maritime arsenal, requires a significant Navy core to base the total 
force around.  The concern is that the future budget requests will fall short of the 
dollars necessary for the Navy’s expansion plan, making the achievement of the 
TFC over the next 30 years questionable.  In order to verify a force structure 
foundation for the TFC, the FY 06 Shipbuilding budget, the FY 07 – FY 11 FYDP, 
and the Navy’s 2007 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan must be examined for their 
feasibility and procurement mix.59  Determination must then be made as to 
whether the Navy is taking actions that are leading to the transformational Fleet 
which will support the TFC or if the Navy’s future plans are still tied to the legacy 
structure of the Cold War era. 
                                            
57 Fleet Size, Naval Vessel Register, www.nvr.navy.mil (Last accessed May 2006) 
58 “ADM Mullen Opposes Navy Fleet Less Than 281 Vessels”, Dave Ahearn, Defense 
Today, Apr. 25, 2006 
59 All data presented in this thesis will be in FY 07 dollar baselines unless otherwise noted. 
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Estimates for the cost of future Fleet procurement vary significantly.  The 
Navy’s cost estimates for each new construction program are at the lower end of 
the spectrum, while the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates are usually on the higher end.  Future budget projections described in 
the following sections of this chapter will utilize data from the Navy and either or 
both the CAIG and CBO for the purpose of displaying the best and worst case 
scenarios concerning budget issues. 
1. Overview of the Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan 
Concurrent with the finalization of the Navy’s budget input for the 
President’s FY 2007 Budget Request, was the development of the Annual Long-
Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2007 report, also known as 
the “30-year shipbuilding plan.”  This report details the Navy’s procurement 
forecast for the next 30 years, ending in 2036.  The FY 2007 report is also where 
the Navy defined its goal of the 313-ship Fleet structure.  The 30-year 
shipbuilding plan was developed alongside the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) report and is designed to support the Navy mission requirements 
of the National Security Strategy.60  The QDR did not specifically endorse the 
Navy’s quantitative force structure that the 30-year shipbuilding report reflects, 
although it did back a carrier end-strength of eleven nuclear aircraft carriers and 
promoted growth in the size of the Fleet, including adding a riverine capability,  to 
combat the threats faced in the GWOT. 
Table 6 shows the total ship construction plan over the next 30 years for 
all major battle force ships.  280 ships are projected to be purchased over the 
course of the plan’s implementation.   The 30-year timeframe is broken down into 




                                            
60 “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 
2007”, Chief of Naval Operations, delivered to Congress on Feb. 7, 2006 
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• “Near Term”  - equates to the published FYDP period. 
• “Mid Term”  - beyond the FYDP out to a 15-year future point, using 
Defense-wide planning scenarios and intelligence assessments of 
future force structure based on programs already underway. 
• “Far Term”  - beyond the 15-year mark into the future and is based 
on Navy analytical efforts and notional cost estimates. 
 
The master procurement plan illustrated in Table 6 forms the basis for 
procurement plans put forth in the enacted President’s FY 06 Budget Request 
and projected for the FY 07 - FY 11 FYDP.   
 
  Near Term Mid Term Far Term 
Battle Force FY 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
Carrier CVN      1  1                  1  1                  1                  1                       1  
CG(X)                     1       1   1   2   1   2   2   2   2  2   2   1 
DDG(X)              1   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2 
DD(X)  2       1   1   1  1   1  
Surface 
Combatant 
LCS 2   3   6   6   6  6   5   6   6   5                                               1   3   2   3   6   6   6 
SSN774 1   1   1   1   1  2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   1  
SSN774I                                            1  2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   1   2   1   2   1   2   1   2 Submarine 
SSBN(X)         1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 
LPD17      1   
LSD(X)                                 1  1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1        2   1 
LHD(X)                   1             1   1   1             1                  1 
Amphib 
LHA(R) 1             1    
T-AO(X)                                 1       1  2   2   2   2   2   2   1 
T-AOE                        1   1   1   1 Logistics 
T-AKE 1   1   
M LHA                     1       1  
MLP           1        1  1  
M T-AKE           1   1   1   
MPF(F) 
LMSR                1   1  1   
Connector JHSV           1   1   1                                           1   2 
Support MULTI   1   2   2   1   1  1   2   3   2        1   1 
Total  7   7  11 12 14 13 12 11 11 10  4   6   4   5  9  10 11 11 10 10 10  8   7  10   8  8   8  12 10 11 
Table 6.   Long-Range Naval Vessel Construction Plan61  
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2007”, Chief of Naval Operations, delivered to Congress on Feb. 7, 2006 
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2. FY 06 Shipbuilding Plan 
The FY 06 Shipbuilding Plan originally requested procurement of just four 
new construction ships for the Fleet.   The Navy’s Budget Request asked for 
funding for one Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), one LCS, one 
San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship (LPD-17), and one Combat 
Logistics Force ship (T-AKE) (Appendix D, Figure 14).62  This request was the 
lowest procurement total submitted over the last 9 years and at the lowest level 
(only equaled three other times) in the last 25 years.63  The final version of the 
FY 06 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2863), signed by the President on 
December 30, 2005, contained additional funding for two more LCS units to bring 
the total shipbuilding procurement up to six ships for FY 06.64 
The total approved budget for FY 06 new construction shipbuilding is 
$10.595 billion, which represents approximately 8.6 percent of the total FY 06 
Navy budget appropriation (not including any supplemental additions).  This total 
does not include the original, single LCS, or the T-AKE vessel procurement 
costs.  The LCS was funded in the Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN) account and the T-AKE was funded within the 
National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF).  Had these two ships been included as 
part of the Shipbuilding and Conversion account (SCN) account, the total would 
have been $652 million higher ($275 million for the LCS and $377 million for the 
T-AKE.)65  The two LCS ships added by Congress are to be funded directly by 
the SCN account.  All future procurement for LCS seaframes will be funded 
through the SCN account, and the T-AKE ships are due to continue their funding 
in the NDSF account.  Taken in its original form, the baseline FY 06 Budget 
Request only paid for two new construction ships.  The balance of the SCN 
                                            
62 “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2006/2007 Budget”, Office of Budget, 
Department of the Navy, Feb. 2005 
63 CRS Report RL 32665, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:  Background and 
Issues for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, Feb. 6, 2006 
64 “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2007 Budget”, Office of Budget, Department 
of the Navy, Feb. 2006 
65 “Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy Budget Activity Four” and “National 
Defense SeaLift Fund”, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Estimates Submission, 
Feb. 2006 
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account was allocated for nuclear refueling, advance procurement costs, and 
outfitting for ships acquired in the previous year’s budget. 
The FY 06 budget is not a great leap forward on the path to the 313-ship 
Navy, but it does take the first steps toward expanding the Navy into the mission 
areas necessary to enable the TFC.  Two areas addressed as necessary 
missions for the Navy to expand into are the coastal maritime space and the 
“brown water” of rivers and other inner waterways.  Strengthened by the addition 
of two more LCSs in the procurement total for FY 06, the appropriations required 
for the entire four units of the LCS program Flight 0 phase are completed.  This 
development will accelerate the test and evaluation portion of the introduction of 
the LCS to the Fleet and broaden the database for lessons learned that will be 
applied to the follow-on Flight 1 construction phase.   
An additional cost of the LCS is the mission module warfare packages 
required by each LCS to become a focused-mission platform beyond the basic 
seaframe.  Based on the original budget submission for FY 06 (not including the 
two units added by Congress), the LCS force would have only been two ships in 
acquisition.  The FY 06 RDTEN budget includes the funding for three LCS 
Mission Packages.  This equates to a 3-2 ratio of modules to seaframes for the 
LCS program as initially requested.66  The first four modules procured through 
the RDTEN account average $48 million each.  The cost rises to $54 million 
apiece for the modules procured throughout the FYDP period.67  FY 06 is the 
final budget year that the LCS modules are procured via the RDTEN account.  All 
follow-on budget requests for LCS modules are to be included in the Other 
Procurement, Navy (OPN) account.  The average procurement cost for the LCS 
as a complete mission-capable ship is increased by nearly $100 million, once the 
mission module costs are included.  This “hidden” cost of the LCS program is 
cause for some concern as to the true cost being reflected in the SCN budget 
request, which currently lists a unit cost of $220 million for the base LCS 
                                            
66 Overall FYDP budget data indicate a slightly higher ratio (3.5 – 2), however, a 3-2 ratio will 
be used as a baseline procurement statistic for analysis. 
67 FY 07 Budget Item Justification Sheets for LCS Modules and LCS Mission Package 
Development, Other Procurement, Navy and RDT&E, Navy, Department of the Navy, Feb. 2006 
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seaframe.  CBO estimates put the LCS program at $400 million for each LCS 
and its share of the mission module program.68 
The DOD FY 06 Supplemental Request, submitted to Congress in 
February 2006, contains funding appropriation requests for $28.85 million to 
begin outfitting the NECC Riverine Force.69  This initial funding will equip the first 
riverine squadron with new river combat boats in preparation for their first 
proposed deployment to Iraq in early 2007.  Together with the LCS funding, 
these budget developments are positive TFC actions and will provide capability 
to focus the Fleet on the missions essential to expanding the Navy’s role in the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 
3. FY 07 Budget Request 
The FY 07 budget is the opening round of the Fleet expansion under the 
313-ship plan and the first year of the current FYDP.  Seven ships are requested 
in the FY 07 shipbuilding request (see Table 7), including the procurement 
funding for both units of the dual-lead ship DD(X) program (Appendix D, Figure 
9).  The first two DD(X)s are both to be split-funded across FY 07 and FY 08 
budgets due to the high cost of the new destroyer.  This procurement plan makes 
appropriations to each primary contractor to produce a DD(X) destroyer 
simultaneously.  Lead unit cost for the DD(X) is estimated by the Navy at $3.3 
billion, with slight reductions per unit as follow-on ships are procured.70  Two 
additional LCSs are requested, as is the lead unit of the new Amphibious 
Helicopter Assault (Replacement) (LHA(R)) class.  The combined total for the 
SCN and NDSF (one T-AKE funded) accounts is approximately $8.7 billion. 
The FY 07 budget does not include the procurement funding of the 
riverine force’s small watercraft.  Funding for the boats required by the NECC 
Riverine Group was included in the FY 06 Supplemental Request, but further 
                                            
68 “Resource Implications of the Navy’s 313-Ship Plan”, Congressional Budget Office, Dec. 
16, 2005 
69 “DOD FY 2006 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF)”, Department of Defense, Feb. 24, 2006, p. 40 
70 CRS Report RL 32109, “Navy DD(X), CG(X), and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs:  
Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, 
Mar. 7, 2006 
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funding is not requested in the President’s FY 07 Budget Request.  It can be 
surmised that another supplemental budget request in FY 07 will be the source of 
the additional funding necessary to continue the equipping of the riverine forces.  
The Riverine Group is being developed as a permanent part of the Navy force 
structure and is a high-priority element of the Navy’s participation in the GWOT.  
Future budget outlays will have to be part of the baseline budget in the future in 
order to stabilize its equipment procurement and Operations and Maintenance 
funding.  The baseline FYDP budget plan does not currently include the funding 
program to outfit the equipment for the newly established Riverine Group within 
the NECC.  
B. FY 2007 - FY2011 FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM (FYDP) 
Navy budget request projections are currently addressed in the FYDP 
covering FY 07 through FY 11.  The assets funded via the FYDP will form the 
basis for the Fleet that will be the core of the TFC.  Viability of the TFC depends 
on the support of the near-term procurement decisions to build the proper force 
mix in order to enable inter-Service/agency cooperation.  The FYDP is the first 
step toward building the 313-ship Navy and will require an increased funding plan 
over the new construction appropriations of the recent 2000-2005 period.  Over 
that period, the average funding for ship new construction, excluding the cost of 
nuclear refueling evolutions and modernization projects, was $10.6 billion71.  The 
Navy projection for implementing the 313-ship Fleet plan is an annual 
expenditure of $14.1 billion72 on new construction to build and maintain the 313-
ship level.  The CBO estimate for the annual expenditure level necessary is 
$19.4 billion for new construction.73  Along with the budgeting rate necessary for 
the future Navy force structure, a steady-state replacement rate to maintain it will 
require the average procurement of 9.5 ships per year to keep pace with Fleet 
                                            
71 Most reports cite $10.2 billion, however, this is a FY 05 figure; $10.6 billion is used to 
reflect the constant year 2007 dollar amount. 
72 $14.1 billion is not the commonly referenced figure for the Navy’s annual estimate, 
however, the usual figure of $13.4 billion is in FY 05 dollars.  $14.1 billion is the FY 07 
conversion. 
73 “Potential Costs of the Navy’s 2006 Shipbuilding Plan”, J. Michael Gilmore and Eric J. 
Labs, CBO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Congressional Budget Office, Mar. 30, 2006 
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growth being off-set by the ongoing process of decommissioning older 
combatants.74  After FY 08, procurement numbers start to climb above that level 
with the advent of increased Flight 1 LCS acquisition and continue up to 14 ships 
in FY 11 by the end of the FYDP period. 
Table 7 illustrates the new construction totals included in the FY 07 – FY 
11 FYDP.  A substantial rise in construction funding begins in FY 08 and 
continues over the course of the FYDP.  The increase from FY 08 onward closely 
represents the approximate annual average expenditure of $14.1 billion 
necessary to implement the 313-ship plan.  Table 7 shows examples of the split-
year funding deviations from the full-funding concept for the CVN-21, DD(X) and 
LHA(R) programs.  The costs associated with those three programs alone 
account for 60% of the FY 08 SCN budget.  The totals of Table 7 contain some 
carryover cost data from projects primarily funded in the previous fiscal year.  
Close-out amounts for the last DDG-51 units, an LPD-17, and the RDTEN-
funded LCS units are included in the FYDP requests. 
 FY 2007 Plan and FYDP TY $M 
Ship Types FY07      Qty FY08      Qty FY09      Qty FY10      Qty FY11      Qty 
Total 
FY(07-11) 
$M       Qty 
CVN 21 784 3482         1 3858          1679 541 10,345   1  
SSN 774 2452         1 2499         1 3527         1 3748         1 3766         1 15,992   5 
DD(X) 2568         2 3055 2607         1 2701         1 2308         1 13,240   5 
CG(X)     3235         1 3,235      1 
LPD-17 297 1501         1    1,799      1 
LHA(R) 1136         1 1380  2004         1 1728 6,248      2 
LCS 521           2 948           3 1764         6 1774         6 1825         6 6,832     23
T-AKE 455           1 400           1    855         2 
MPF(F)  36 1595         2 1422         2 3570         4 6,623      8 
JHSV   198           1 174           1 182           1 554         3 
DDG-51 356 86    442 
LCS RDTE 100 37 7   144 
Total New 
Construction 8,669         7 13,425      7 13,556     11 13,503     12 17,156     14 66,308   51
Table 7.   FY 2007-2011 Shipbuilding Budget75 
 
Also of note is the cost of the LCS program each year.  The stated goal of 
the LCS program was to remain within a $220 million (FY 05$) cost structure for 
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the seaframes, however, the FYDP average cost for LCS is $298 million.  This 
represents a 35% increase over the FY 07 adjusted $223 million goal.  
Converting the $948 million FY 08 Then-Year dollars for 3 LCSs to FY 07 
constant dollars shows an even higher unit cost of $307 million per LCS.  This 
figure is significantly greater than the original $220 million target for the LCS 
program, even when considering adjustments for inflation, and is a sign that the 
cost of the program over the long-term may be much greater than originally 
anticipated. 
The FYDP’s new construction procurement places most of the emphasis 
on re-capitalization of the current asset types within the Fleet.  Several new 
classes of ships are started in the FYDP, however, they are generally only 
replacements for the older ship-class units that are being retired.  CVN-21, SSN-
774, DD(X), CG(X), LPD-17, LHA(R), and the T-AKE ships are all upgraded 
versions of previous warship classes.  All of these platforms are geared for Major 
Combat Operations (MCO) in the Blue-water environment or standard 
expeditionary operations.  Within the FYDP procurement plan, only the LCS 
program is a new approach to naval warfare and a step toward the TFC with a 
platform that can better fulfill the GWOT mission.  The acquisition of 23 LCSs 
represents 45% of the total number of ships to be procured, yet is only a small 
portion of the overall new construction budget, accounting for 9.4% of the FYDP 
dollar total. 
C. 30-YEAR SHIPBUILDING PLAN AND THE TFC 
1. 30-Year Plan Budget Implications 
As stated previously, the average annual funding necessary to achieve 
and sustain the 30-year shipbuilding plan is $14.1 billion.  This represents an 
average budget increase of over 33 percent based on the 2000 to 2005 new 
construction appropriation average of $10.6 billion.  During the FYDP period, the 
overall Navy budget rises from $127.3 billion in FY 07 to a level of $140 billion by 
FY 10.  The budget flattens to maintain nearly the same level for FY 11.  Overall, 
the Navy budget only raises a total of nine percent in FY 07 constant dollars over 
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this period.76  Over the same timeframe, based on Table 7 data, the FYDP for 
new construction shipbuilding reflects a constant dollar increase of 82 percent 
between FY 07 and FY 11.77  New construction shipbuilding, in terms of 
percentage of the total annual budget, represents 6.5 percent in FY 07 and 10.7 
percent in FY 11. 
This issue leads to the question of what is being reduced within the budget 
in order to increase the percentage and constant dollar amount in the new 
construction procurement accounts (SCN and NDSF).  The primary area where 
funding is reduced in the FY 07 budget request is in the RDTEN account.  Nearly 
$2 billion less is requested for RDTEN than in the previous year.  This is 
explained in the FY 07 Budget Highlights book as a response to several 
programs moving into a mature technology phase and not requiring as high a 
level of RDTEN funds.  Research and development budgets are estimated to fall 
from $19 billion to the $14 billion level by 2012 and remain flat for the rest of the 
30-year plan timeframe.78  The multiple new shipbuilding programs utilizing new 
and unproven technology may cause a re-evaluation of the Navy’s ability to cut 
the RDTEN budget in later years of the FYDP period. 
Referring to Table 6, aside from the acquisition of the LCS, the 30-year 
shipbuilding plan has only minimally altered the ships that will outfit the Fleet in 
the future.  The TFC does benefit from the expansion of the Navy’s main battle 
force size, in both numbers and technological improvements, but this is an area 
where the Fleet was already strong.  The 30-year shipbuilding plan makes a solid 
commitment to the LCS program, budgeting 55 ships by FY 16.  The peak 
shipbuilding years in the plan are due mainly to the high number of LCS units 
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being procured.  The LCS brings the Fleet closer to the battle space of the 
GWOT in the littoral regions.  However, both in numbers and relative platform 
size, it could be considered a slightly smaller replacement for the place in the 
Fleet currently filled by the FFG-7 class ships.  A mission configured LCS, 
however, will not be the capability equivalent of a multi-mission platform like a 
FFG-7. 
The major units being acquired in the 30-year shipbuilding plan still 
represent a primarily Major Combat Operations-focused force structure.    The 
aircraft carrier force is maintained at the 2006 QDR recommended level of 11 
carriers through 2018, then climbs to 12 carriers for the duration of the 30-year 
plan.  Questions must be raised as to the necessity of a carrier strength increase 
and whether there will be air wing assets to outfit a 12th carrier once the Fleet 
acquires it.79 
DD(X) is a major program for the surface force and focuses on the land 
attack mission as one of its main selling points.  The DD(X) will be outfitted with 
several new technology systems, including the Navy’s Advanced Gun System 
(AGS) which will be able to provide long-range gunfire support to Marine units 
ashore.  The DD(X) will also be a cruise missile platform for deep strike power 
projection.  The cost of the DD(X) has been a troubling element of the program 
and is likely to blame for the reduction of the original vision of 16 to 24 units down 
to the current plan of seven.  The low number of DD(X)s actually procured give 
the appearance of too much capability in too few platforms.  Seven units doesn’t 
provide much depth in the warfighting areas DD(X) was designed for and does 
not contribute significantly to the expansion of naval power into transformational 
areas envisioned by the TFC. 
Procurement of the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) appears to be too 
limited for it to make much impact on the Fleet in the future.  Only three JHSVs 
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are programmed for the lifespan of the platform, which only provides one unit per 
coast and one unit as a spare.  This leaves the Sea Basing concept with only 
limited utilization of the JHSV platform, however, the TFC would integrate the 
Army JHSVs into the Sea Basing plan and treat the entire number of Navy and 
Army JHSVs as one force.   
The scalable force of the TFC has yet to be addressed by the 30-year 
shipbuilding plan with the heavy emphasis on the major Blue-water oriented 
platforms.   As noted in earlier chapters, the TFC is a method of adapting the 
Navy to the threat faced in the current and future years, mainly as part of the 
GWOT.  The large capital investment in the 30-year shipbuilding plan and 
individual costs of the new platforms in development leave little room for cost 
increases to be absorbed.  The cost affordability of the Near- and Mid-Term 
portions of the plan will have a significant impact on the entire Navy budget in the 
coming years.  
2. 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Affordability Issues 
The costs of the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan are the weakest point of the 
plan.  The Navy estimate of $14.1 billion is questioned by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) as being too optimistic.  The CBO believes that the actual 
cost of the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan will be closer to a $19.4 billion average 
annually.  Table 8 compares data on the Navy and CBO’s estimated 
projections for the Average Unit Cost (AUC) of several major new construction 
programs over the entire period from 2007 to 2035.  The DD(X) program shows a 
28% difference in estimates, followed closely by the similarly designed CG(X) 
with a 22% variation.  The LHA(R), being a more limited procurement program, 
exceeds both surface combatant programs with a 64% difference.  Serious 








 Average per ship cost
(FY 07$ B) 
Ship Type Navy CBO 
CVN 21 9.4 9.6 
DD(X) 2.8 3.6 
CG(X) 2.7 3.2 
SSN 774 2.1 2.7 
LHA(R) 1.4 2.3 
Table 8.   Average Unit Cost of Platforms80     
 
One of the primary issues facing the annual budgets associated with the 
30-year plan is the coordination of when to procure each platform so as not to 
program too many of the high cost platforms all in the same fiscal year.  The 
CVN-21 program is the most expensive shipbuilding project of the plan, with a 
projected procurement rate of one carrier every five years.  The high cost of the 
CVN-21 ships has resulted in the use of several years of advance procurement 
budgeting followed by split-funding across two fiscal years once the ship is 
included in the President’s Budget Request.81  The next major program 
expenses are the costs associated with the DD(X) and the related CG(X) ships.  
The lead ship cost for DD(X) is $3.3 billion, and the CAIG and CBO estimate that 
that number may actually be $4.1 or $4.7 billion, respectively, based on their 
method of historical cost to weight relationships and a higher inflation rate, based 
on a higher rate historically effecting naval shipbuilding.  The danger in the DD(X) 
program is that if the actual costs are closer to the CBO’s lead ship estimated 
cost, then the procurement of DD(X) will impact the budget dollars available for 
other programs.  
As a counter to the high cost of the new platforms being procured is the 
cost savings that will be realized due to the smaller crew size of the newer ships.  
It is estimated that CVN-21 will have approximately 1000 fewer ship’s company 
and airwing personnel necessary to fulfill its mission requirements.  DD(X) has a 
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crew estimate that is approximately 150-170 personnel, which is roughly half the 
crew size of the current DDG-51 ships.  A figure of $60,000 per crewmember per 
year is an approximate amount for the cost of manpower for a Navy ship.82  This 
equates to an annual cost savings of $60 million for CVN-21, $9.6 for DD(X) and 
$8.7 million for LCS (over a FFG-7).  Projected out over the expected operational 
lifespan of a particular platform, CVN-21 saves $3 billion, DD(X) $336 million, 
and LCS saves $218 million just on manpower alone.83 
The manpower savings are evidence that upgrades in technology and 
manpower efficiency can potentially make a large difference in the lifecycle costs 
of a Navy platform.  CVN-21 works out from a $9.4 billion AUC minus the $3 
billion in military personnel savings down to roughly a $6.4 billion cost, which is 
less than the Navy’s projected cost for a repeat build of the Nimitz-class design 
(estimated at $7.4 billion84).  LCS shows significant savings on manpower over 
the FFG-7 class of warship.  If the LCS program can keep procurement costs 
under control, the manpower savings can be factored in to ensure the program is 
considered affordable. 
The manpower savings over the lifecycle of the ship does not offset the 
high cost of the DD(X) program, however.  The $336 million savings over the 35-
year lifespan of a destroyer is not a significant reduction in the overall AUC of the 
DD(X), which at a minimum is $2.8 billion.  The roughly adjusted $2.5 billion 
dollar cost of a DD(X) is still far above the $1.8 billion average for a single unit 
per year procurement of DDG-51 ships.85  If the DDG-51 is procured at a 2 or 3-
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ships per year rate, the AUC drops to $1.4 billion or $1.25 billion, respectively.86  
The DDG-51 Modernization program expects to cut the manpower needs of the 
current DDG-51 crew and realize an average $37 million reduction in personnel 
costs over the remaining 18-year lifespan of each ship.87   
The high cost of the DD(X) and the related CG(X) program are 
demonstrations that the Navy must keep costs under control if the 30-year 
shipbuilding plan is going to be executable.  If costs rise to the level that is 
estimated by the CBO, the Navy will have to re-evaluate the priorities of the 
shipbuilding program, other procurement programs, the RDTEN account, and the 
Operations and Support budgets to determine where reductions will have to 
come.  It is doubtful that a significant rise in costs can be covered by increasing 
the overall Navy Budget Request input to the President’s Budget to Congress. 
3. Effect on the TFC 
The overall 30-year shipbuilding plan provides the TFC with the core naval 
forces necessary to maintain the Navy’s dominance versus any peer competitor.  
While the TFC is a broad-based integration of all the major U.S. maritime assets, 
it is still vital that the Navy retain its superiority in the Major Combat Operations 
arena.  The high cost of the 30-year shipbuilding plan does endanger the ability 
of the Navy to broaden its mission baseline into the areas of interoperability with 
other military and government agencies. 
The TFC is designed to provide the force necessary to combat the level of 
threat faced.  Ideally, the TFC will save costs to the Navy in the long run, due to 
the Navy not having to procure the systems and vessels to accomplish missions 
where the Navy is not well suited at present.  The TFC force will be the strongest 
and most integrated in the homeland security and defense operations area.  In 
this battle space, the Navy should not have to expend a great deal of resources 
to duplicate the efforts of other U.S. agencies.  Where the Navy should apply 
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itself in the homeland operations area is in joint training and cooperation with the 
forces that already exist among the USCG, Customs and Border Patrol, and 
other federal agencies. 
Where the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan will affect the TFC the most is 
in the global application of the TFC.  The 30-year plan is heavily weighted to the 
Blue-water Navy concept of operations, even with the LCS included.  The 
expense of the major programs such as CVN-21 and DD(X) will reduce the 
amount of Navy appropriations that can be devoted to the lower level mission 
assets that may be called upon to engage the GWOT threat as it develops into 
the foreseeable future. 
Several aspects of the 30-year shipbuilding plan and the near-term 
procurement budget requests indicate that the emphasis will remain on status 
quo force structure rather than a transformation of the Navy to a new 
environment of operational engagement.  The key issues of the future Fleet 
structure budget plans and composition that will affect the Navy’s progress 





V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY 
The Total Fleet Concept (TFC) is a broad view of the Fleet of the future.  
In the TFC, the maritime forces of the U.S. Government are arrayed over the 
entire globe to ensure the successful achievement of U.S. policy.  This force 
must be capable of working with the smallest allied or host nation, and be 
prepared to confront a peer competitor at the nation state level.  The Navy forms 
a substantial portion of the envisioned TFC maritime force.  The scalable nature 
of the TFC is designed to give the future combatant commanders the options 
required to conduct the “long war” of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT.)  The 
assets of the TFC include, but are not limited to the assets of today’s Fleet.  This 
thesis was an examination of the budgetary environment that is projected for the 
near-term as part of the Future Years Defense Program, and the force structure 
plan that the Navy has mapped out for the next 30 years, with the end goal of 
determining the extent to which the Navy’s improvement plan is structured for the 
transformational support necessary to realize the TFC.  
Several key issues and observations relative to the implementation of the 
TFC are drawn from the budget analysis of Chapter IV.  Below is a reiteration of 
these issues and observations: 
• The projected budget requirement for the Navy to pursue the 313-
ship force structure may range between $14.1 and $19.4 billion in 
order to maintain the steady state sustainment rate of building 9.4 
ships per year.  At a minimum, this represents a 33 percent 
increase over the average annual shipbuilding appropriation from 
FY 00 to FY 05. 
• The cost per unit of the LCS has been requested in the FYDP 
budgets at a higher rate than the program’s target goal of $220 
million, indicating that the LCS total procurement costs will be 
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significantly higher than the Navy’s program estimate of $17.6 
billion for the seaframes alone.88 
• Research and Development funds are being reduced in the FYDP.  
Careful examination of the impact on new ship development with 
multiple un-tried systems should be considered before R & D 
funding is reduced. 
• The LCS is numerically replacing the FFG-7 frigates but it is not a 
capabilities replacement for that vessel class. 
• The Navy’s stated requirement for carrier end strength is eleven 
ships, however, the 30-year shipbuilding plan has the carrier force 
increasing to twelve after 2018 and remaining at that level 
indefinitely. 
• A seven-unit procurement for DD(X) appears to be too much 
technology in too few platforms to justify its exorbitant expense. 
• The Navy procurement numbers of the Joint High Speed Vessel 
appear to be too few to adequately provide a robust capability to 
the Fleet. 
• The high cost of the 30-year shipbuilding procurement plan does 
not leave much leeway in its ability to be flexible if costs rise or new 
acquisition programs become viable. 
• The Navy expects to save costs over the lifespan of new platforms, 
such as CVN-21 and DD(X) through crew size reductions. 
• Manpower savings for DD(X) over the 35-year life of the vessel will 
only result in a $336 million in savings. 
• The high cost of the DD(X) / CG(X) family of ships indicates that 
every effort must be made to reduce shipbuilding costs. 
Despite the critical nature of these issues, the Fleet in 2006 is as capable as it 
ever was to accomplish the Blue-water mission.  However, maintaining its 
dominance in the Blue-water mission area is not enough.  The Navy must carry 
                                            
88 CRS Report RL 32109, “Navy DD(X), CG(X), and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs:  
Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, 
Mar. 7, 2006 
61 
its share of the littoral and coastal/Brown-water combat mission.  Even though 
the USCG is embarking on its largest procurement spending program in its 
history, it won’t be enough to fill all the roles necessary for homeland security and 
the GWOT.  This is where the Navy and the TFC can be helpful in the maritime 
plans for the nation’s defense. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. National Fleet Policy Blueprint 
The National Fleet Policy agreement is an important foundation for the 
TFC.  The policy of encouraging cooperation and mutual support between the 
USCG and the Navy is at the heart of what the TFC will represent for the 
maritime forces of the U.S.  The GWOT has given the 2006 restatement of the 
National Fleet Policy more substance for the two Services to build upon when 
planning for the future. 
The concept of the National Fleet Policy is an outstanding model for taking 
two components of the U.S. maritime forces and leveraging the best features of 
each to build a more efficient and effective combination.  The larger vision of the 
TFC represents the National Fleet Policy on a grander scale.  The capabilities of 
all U.S. maritime forces would be coordinated, both operationally and at the 
material procurement level.  Economies of scale in procurement of like assets 
would enable all U.S. military and federal maritime agencies to benefit from lower 
cost equipment acquisition and greater buying power from the appropriations 
they are provided. 
The actual implementation of synchronized Navy and USCG projects in 
the spirit of the National Fleet Policy has not yet been achieved on a large scale.  
The National Fleet Policy’s effect on procurement has been limited to Command 
and Control (C2) systems and programs such as the 57mm gun and surface 
search radar for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) being planned for the larger 
Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) cutters.89  At the higher level of acquisition, it 
has so far been a missed opportunity for the LCS and USCG IDS programs not 
to pursue commonality and plan for a joint procurement program which would 
                                            
89 Phone Interview with LCDR Chris Strong, USCG, N76, May 5, 2006 
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marry the LCS requirements with the National Security Cutter or the Off-shore 
Patrol Cutter, all of which are in a common range of size and capability (refer to 
Appendix C.)  Not only would such a program have been able to achieve 
commonality of equipment between the Services, it would have lessened the cost 
of procurement through the economies of scale for increasing the production of a 
chosen design.  The opportunity is not lost to pursue a combined program plan.  
Steps could be taken to develop the right platform(s) to satisfy the joint 
requirements of the Navy and USCG programs.  Separately, the two Services’ 
shipbuilding programs are very ambitious and the possibility exists that neither 
will be completed as planned without a reduction in the overall costs by way of 
finding the efficiencies of combined programs. 
2. The QDR and the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) champions inter-agency 
cooperation throughout that document.  The QDR is an overview report on the 
forces envisioned to meet the current and projected future threat.  On that level it 
has strong support for the philosophy of the TFC.  The 30-year shipbuilding plan, 
on the other hand, is a specific plan to support the 313-ship Navy force structure, 
which is firmly based on the Navy’s ability to carry out Major Combat Operations 
(MCO).  While the TFC has the Navy’s MCO-structured force at its core, it is not 
the Fleet that will expand the reach of the Navy into the battlespace where the 
current threat is found.  The mission of the future Fleet is shifting to a new type of 
combat operations.  The more the nation adjusts to fight the GWOT, the less 
relevant the Navy of today becomes in its current and proposed form.  In some 
respects, the 313-ship plan is building a Fleet that is too large for the threat being 
faced. 
The Navy has begun several programs that serve as the stepping stones 
to the future force envisioned by the TFC.  The GWOT has shown that the Navy 
has a greater role to play in mission areas that are not currently addressed by 
today’s force structure.  The LCS program is clearly transformational thinking in 
terms of revolutionary methods to employ naval force on a focused mission area 
and still maximize platform flexibility.  The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) 
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program is also transformational and shows that joint acquisition programs to 
solve common needs are feasible and desirable.  Finally, the development of the 
Riverine Group returns the Navy to the forefront of the Brown-water naval 
environment where the asymmetrical threats of the GWOT call for a flexible, 
scalable force. 
The above programs, unfortunately, are not enough to demonstrate true 
transformational attributes within the Navy’s FYDP and 30-year shipbuilding plan.  
The Navy’s proposal for the 313-ship force structure, which is the driving element 
of the FYDP and the 30-year shipbuilding plan, is not a transformation of the 
Fleet.  A majority of the budget resources available are being applied to new 
versions of the traditional MCO platforms already populating the Fleet.  CVN-21, 
DD(X), and CG(X) are high technology, advanced designs of the major 
combatant classes that are today’s Fleet workhorses.  All will employ next-
generation systems to enhance operational capability, however, the platforms 
and their mission-employment should not be considered transformational. 
The chief difficulty with the idea of transformation in the future Fleet is the 
misconception that the application of new technology is by itself transformational.  
What is transformation for the Navy?  The mission is where transformation 
impacts the organization.  Stealthy ship designs, new radar systems, advanced 
naval guns, and new missile systems are advances in technology, but do not 
significantly transform the way the Navy fights, only that systems of today will be 
improved tomorrow.  Even the Navy’s emphasis on networked warfare 
information systems is not truly a change in the way the Navy fights.  It merely 
enhances the capabilities and tactics of warfighting doctrine already being 
utilized.  Aegis, Tomahawk, and precision air-delivered weapons were all 
technological wonders at the time of their introduction to the Fleet, but none were 
transformational in the way they affected the mission of the Navy.  Similarly, the 
revolutionary technological advances on the ships of the FYDP Fleet were 
science fiction a few short years ago, but they do not appear to be a major 
change to the mission of the Navy. 
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The DD(X) program is a prime example of a proposed ship that is to be 
equipped with numerous systems that are the leading edge of technology, but 
the bottom-line is that for $3.3 billion, it provides two guns and eighty Vertical 
Launch System missile cells in the largest surface combatant hull built since the 
USS Long Beach in 1957.90  The expense of the DD(X) is out of proportion to 
what it brings to the Fleet.  In the three latest conflicts the U.S. has been involved 
in (Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq), naval gunfire support played no role.  The 
portion of the budget for DD(X) needs to go toward more beneficial Navy 
procurement. 
3. TFC Effect on Stakeholders 
Implementation of the TFC and the changes it calls for in the structure of 
the U.S. maritime forces will have a profound impact on the various DOD, federal 
agencies, lawmakers and business representatives who are connected to those 
maritime forces.  The TFC will require a change in how some stakeholders look 
at the structure of the Fleet.  Any change to the procurement budget and the 
types of platforms procured affects not only the end-users in the Fleet, but those 
who are responsible for providing for the Fleet.  Convincing stakeholders of the 
necessary changes to meet the new environment of the threat and put the Navy 
on the path to the TFC will be difficult, as evidenced in statements by 
Congressman Solomon Ortiz (D-TX) concerning funding for the NECC (and the 
Riverine Group): 
 “While we encourage innovation, it will not come at the neglect of what 
makes our nation’s military the best in the world” and “ensures that the Navy will 
be able to continue meeting its core responsibilities in the defense of our 
nation.”91 
 
The Navy’s core force, as noted in Chapter III, has a far greater combat 
capability today than a larger Fleet of seventeen years ago, yet any change in 
the force structure is perceived as a negative impact on the Navy’s ability to 
                                            
90 CRS Report RL 32109, “Navy DD(X), CG(X), and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs:  
Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, 
Mar. 7, 2006 
91 “Lawmakers Debate Future of Navy Expeditionary Combat Command”, Christopher J. 
Castelli, Inside the Navy, www.insidedefense.com, May 8, 2006 (Last accessed May 2006) 
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perform its missions.  This is readily apparent in the conflicting views that have 
arisen over the 2006 QDR goal of maintaining the carrier force at eleven.  The 
House Armed Services Committee has taken the 30-year shipbuilding plan’s 
carrier force drop to ten in 2013, then increase to twelve ships after 201892, as a 
sign that the Navy should not reduce the current force at all and really is 
signaling that keeping twelve is the number needed for the future.  The House 
committee writes: 
 It is apparent to the committee that the decision to allow the 
force structure to fall to 10 in the near future is fiscally rather 
operationally driven.  The committee believes that the Navy should 
continue to maintain no less than 12 operational aircraft carriers in 
order to meet potential global commitments.   The committee 
believes that a reduction below 12 aircraft carriers puts the nation in 
a position of unacceptable risk.93 
Change of the force structure will also affect shipbuilding concerns (large 
shipyards fear losses, while smaller builders anticipate gains).  Both industry 
representatives and Congressional members are protective of the shipbuilding 
industrial base.  The TFC emphasizes a broad base of platforms that will require 
funding to be taken from some large, traditional vessel programs in order to build 
the scalable force the TFC calls for.  Some funding will have to be distributed to 
the other agencies connected to the TFC force, which will reduce funding 
provided directly to the Navy.  When a particular type of capability is recommend 
to address a threat concern, and that capability already exists at some level in 
another agency, then that agency should receive additional resources necessary 
to meet the threat. 
C. OBSERVATIONS 
The Navy’s future in the TFC at first appears to represent two opposing 
themes.  First, the TFC calls for the combination of maritime forces from across 
the DOD and other federal agencies in order to create the scalable force to meet 
the challenges of the GWOT, in the realm of homeland security and in the arena 
                                            
92 “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 
2007”, Department of the Navy, Feb. 2006 
93 “House and Senate Authorizers Debate Plans to Retire Navy Carrier,” Christopher J. 
Castelli, www.insidedefense.com, May 15, 2006 (Last accessed May 2006) 
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of overseas power projection.  Second, in order to contribute a force that satisfies 
the TFC, the Navy should pursue a transformational structure independently that 
will enable it to procure and deploy forces across all levels of maritime warfare 
needs.  These two schools of thought exist now, with real tensions between them 
because of limited resources (i.e. dollars) available to fulfill the capabilities 
sought.  While these two themes seemed to contradict each other, they are in 
fact complimentary in the context that each must be viewed. 
Homeland security of the U.S. is a vast mission task.  The maritime forces 
available to defend the U.S. are many and, under the TFC, would provide the 
nation with a formidable defense against the multi-level threats that could be 
positioned against this country.  The forces of the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs 
and Border Patrol (CBP), and other federal law enforcement agencies are 
equipped and trained for the homeland security mission.  They are also 
complemented by State and local units.  The Navy has assets which it can bring 
to the table to augment the USCG and the other agencies when the threat 
requires it, however, it is unnecessary for the Navy to duplicate the efforts that 
are already in place.  The TFC brings integrated coordination and planning to the 
scalable forces that already exist in order to eliminate wasteful overlaps in 
capability and resources. 
The Navy’s role in the TFC becomes much different in the forward-
deployed defense of the U.S. and its interest.  The maritime assets to fulfill the 
TFC requirement for scalable forces outside of the U.S. will likely be met by a 
transformed Navy, perhaps drawing on some homeland security assets, such as 
the USCG or Customs and Border Patrol for assistance.  However, current and 
future global operations demand a Navy force that can fight at the varying levels 
of threat that is faced.  Forces must be of the types to form close ties to our allies 
and friendly host nations, which indicates that assets like the LCS and riverine 
forces may have more prominent roles in future mission accomplishment.  The 
force structure of the Navy in the TFC will have to be built to enable combatant 
commanders to have the options of scalable force, rather than strictly the high 
intensity power projection force of today. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Total Fleet Concept’s effectiveness will rely on presence.  Presence 
means numbers.  The TFC Fleet is a fleet that can have assets in place to 
confront the nation’s enemies and assist allies when needed.  The Navy of today 
and the Navy of the FYDP is heavily weighted towards the major capital ships of 
the Carrier Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike Group structure.  The 
resources currently planned to build the 313-ship Navy may exhaust the 
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account with little flexibility to really 
transform the Navy.  The Navy’s ability to fight and win the Major Combat 
Operations mission must be preserved, but there are options to the future plan 
that should be considered in order to apply the Navy’s budget toward the 
transformational structure of a TFC-based Navy. 
1. Aircraft Carrier Procurement Plan 
The QDR94 and the 313-ship Fleet plan clearly point out the near-term 
future aircraft carrier requirement is eleven ships (refer to Chapter III, Table 2).  
The 30-year shipbuilding plan shows the carrier force growing to twelve ships 
after 2018 and remaining at that level indefinitely.95  This is an unneeded 
procurement expense and the carrier replacement program schedule should be 
modified to eliminate this increase.  After years of operating eleven carriers as 
the standard force structure, adding a twelfth unit will carry extremely expensive 
comprehensive costs (infrastructure regeneration and outfitting a new carrier 
airwing for the ship) beyond the costs of the carrier itself. 
2. Limiting DD(X)  
DD(X) should be limited to the two units in the 2007 Budget Request.  The 
two units will serve as prototype technology demonstrators and provide the 
shipbuilding industry with projects to maintain continuous operation.  The DD(X) 
is too expensive for the benefits it provides the Fleet.  Seven units would not 
provide a significant capability to the Fleet and end up draining the shipbuilding 
budget.  Alternatives to the land attack mission exist in the Ohio-class SSGNs 
                                            
94 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 48 
95 “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 
2007”, Chief of Naval Operations, delivered to Congress on Feb. 7, 2006 
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and the current CG-52 and DDG-51 classes.  During the construction of the two 
DD(X)s, alternative platform development could be undertaken to deploy the 
Advanced Gun System on a less expensive platform dedicated to the naval 
gunfire mission, such as an LPD-17 or a modified DDG-51 hull form, as long as 
that mission is deemed necessary for support of the Marines.  Likewise, a lower 
cost platform to perform the Tomahawk land attack mission integrated with the 
DD(X)’s ASW capability could be purchased in numbers significant enough to 
provide a viable class of ships to the Fleet. 
3. Attention to the Littorals 
The LCS program is a good start on the transformational type of Fleet 
assets needed, but the program of littoral combatants should be expanded.  A 
new platform based on a patrol boat design should be incorporated into the Fleet 
to provide a bridge between the LCS and the true “brown water” assets of the 
Riverine Group.  Re-engineering of a larger Cyclone-class (PC) type of vessel 
with influence from the USCG IDS Fast Response Cutter should be pursued to 
enable the forward deployed Navy to integrate more effectively with the littoral 
navies of allied nations and provide a common baseline platform for Navy and 
USCG training and personnel exchange programs. 
The time is still available to leverage the LCS program advancements with 
the USCG Off-Shore Patrol Cutter (OPC) portion of the IDS.  The Navy should 
investigate the options and benefits of merging its later-years LCS procurement 
program with the USCG’s OPC program in order to maximize the budget savings 
available to a larger scale common procurement plan.  There would be no better 
way to begin force integration toward the TFC than to have common vessels 
between the two Services.  Should the Navy become more involved in the 
homeland security mission, a platform with maximum commonality and familiarity 
with the other agencies involved could enable the Navy to seamlessly integrate 
into joint training and operations.  Navy and USCG Program Executive Offices 
should also pursue a combination of their procurement programs for the vertical 
take-off unmanned aerial vehicles (VTUAV) being developed for LCS and for the 
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IDS (Appendix D, Figure 16).  These separate programs are an unnecessary 
redundancy for projects of similar purpose. 
4. Larger Scope Riverine Forces 
Procurement for the Riverine Group’s assets in the future should become 
part of the baseline President’s Budget rather than in the annual bridge 
Supplemental Requests.  The riverine forces are being established as a 
permanent standing element within the Navy force structure, therefore it could be 
seen as a better justified expense (in the eyes of Congress) by being placed 
within the auxiliary craft section of the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) 
account request. 
In addition to the actual riverine combat craft, the Navy must plan for the 
supporting forces to augment the riverine squadrons.  A review of the riverine 
force operations in Vietnam revealed a large array of support vessels necessary 
to carry out dedicated riverine operations, including larger support vessels and 
airborne helicopter support.96  In order for the new Navy Riverine Group to 
operate as an effective, autonomous force outside of areas where major U.S. 
combat operations are underway, it too will require a support infrastructure to be 
funded.  Procurement of shallow-water vessel types like the JHSV or a fully 
developed platform based on the Sea Fighter (FSF-1) (noted in Chapter II; 
Appendix D, Figure 8), with logistics and helicopter support capability, would 
enhance the Riverine Group’s ability to sustain their missions. 
5. Training and Exercises 
The heart of the Total Fleet Concept is the interoperability of all maritime 
forces.  In order to work toward that goal, opportunities where training at the 
basic operations level can be merged should be sought out.  One particular area 
where a joint training baseline should be pursued is in the area of small boat 
operations.  The re-establishment of the Navy’s Riverine forces requires 
dedicated training in small boat skills and tactics.  Many other organizations have 
small boat forces that require the same training.  The USCG operates the Special 
                                            
96 Don Blankenship’s Mobile Riverine Force Homepage, www.rivervet.com, (Last accessed 
Apr. 2006) 
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Mission Training Center at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, training small boat 
unit sailors from the Coast Guard, Navy, Marine Corps, and several federal 
agencies.  Current Marine Corps riverine personnel are trained there, although 
no decision has been made as to whether Navy riverine personnel will follow the 
same plan.97  Training for the Navy Riverine Group should join with the current 
Special Mission Training Center program rather than set-up a new training center 
that will likely duplicate a majority of the current USCG program. 
Another aspect of moving forward to achieve the TFC operational vision is 
to enable joint operational exercises between the maritime agencies.  The Navy, 
USCG, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and others should coordinate multiple 
exercises around the U.S. to put the TFC to the test.  Navy Riverine Group forces 
in combination with LCS participation, USCG small boat and cutter forces, CBP 
and regional agencies should begin conducting homeland security/defense 
exercises in locations such as the Mississippi river delta, Puget Sound, Potomac 
River, and various coastal locations.  A littoral / coastal aggressor unit should 
also be formed to add to the complexity and realism of the exercises.   
E. AFTERWORD 
The challenge for the Navy and the nation as a whole, in the coming 20-30 
years will be to manage its assets in order to successfully prepare for known and 
possibly unexpected threats.  The Global War on Terrorism and related 
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has placed the Navy into an operating 
environment that was not envisioned for the Fleet configuration of today.  Not 
only has the type of threat changed, from a predominantly nation-state military 
adversary to a more elusive, asymmetrical faction-based opponent, but the 
geographical battlespace has shifted also.  The threat that presents itself to the 
Navy today and very likely into the long-term future is a threat at a level below 
the Navy’s primary asset range. 
The scope of defending against the unknown poses considerable 
challenges.  Creating a force that could combat every possible scenario would be 
                                            
97 Phone interview with BMC Basilici, USN, Navy Training representative attached to U.S. 
Coast Guard Special Mission Training Center, MCB Camp Lejeune, Apr. 11, 2006 
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expensive.  The Total Fleet Concept is a way to leverage the expertise and the 
assets that the U.S. has already invested in, focus the way that expertise is 
utilized and create a distributed force that can be expanded or contracted as 
necessary to meet the threats as they arise. 
No organization will ever receive a budget appropriation that covers all the 
programs and assets that it would desire to meet its mission requirements.  The 
TFC vision of forces will reduce redundant spending and asset procurement, find 
commonality across the board for training and operations, and focus the resource 
dollars that each organization has available more effectively on programs that 
enhance its strengths. 
This thesis is a step toward seeing what factors affect the configuration of 
the Fleet, both today and “the possible” tomorrow.  Many areas remain to be 
explored further as transformation of the U.S. maritime force takes shape in the 
coming years.  Further research on several topics could include deeper study of 
the budget implications of a reorganization of the U.S. Coast Guard’s missions, 
with its Homeland Security and Defense missions becoming a branch of the 
Navy (in the same manner as the U.S. Marine Corps) and its law enforcement 
and safety functions being separated to a new entity within the Department of 
Homeland Security, possibly as a branch of the Customs and Border Patrol.  
Fleet configuration study is also a broad topic for more in-depth examination, 
especially the cost/benefit to national defense of the mix of platforms now being 
procured or planned for the near future.  Topics such as these call for continuous 
study in order to provide the leadership of the Department of Defense and the 
Navy with options they may consider as they make the decisions to shape the 
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Source: GAO Report, GAO-05-255, “Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to 
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APPENDIX C: INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM CUTTERS 
COMPARED TO LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF IDS CUTTERS AND NOTIONAL LCS 
Characteristics NSC OPC Notional LCS 
Length Overall 418' 360' 400' 
Beam 54' 54' 45' – 90’ 
Draft 21' 20' 14' 
Displacement 4300 LT 3715 LT 3000 LT 
Speed 28 kts 25 kts 50kts 
Maximum Range 12,000 NM 9,000 NM 4000 NM 
Endurance 60 days 45 days 30 days 
Propulsion 2 Diesel Engines, 1 Gas Turbine 4 Main Diesel Engines 2 Diesel Engines and 2 Gas Turbines 
Gun  57MM Gun with SPQ-9B radar targeting 57MM Gun with optical targeting 
57 mm with radar; 
RAM SAM system 





USCG (VUAV, HH-65, MCH), 
Customs, DoD, and NATO (up to H-
60 Aft Wheel Variant) if equipped 
with compatible Aircraft Handling 
System Gear 
USCG (VUAV, HH-65, MCH), 
Customs, DoD, and NATO (up to H-
60 Aft Wheel Variant) if equipped 




Boats 2 LRI/SRP in any combo Stern launch - 1 person 
2 LRI/SRP in any combo 




C4ISR Current C4 Design Increment plus Excomms Phase I & II 
Current C4 Design Increment plus 
Excomms Phase I & II USN C4ISR standard
 Source: United States Coast Guard website, www.uscg.mil and LCS data referenced from General 
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Figure 9.   DD-1000 Zumwalt-class, aka DD(X) 
National Security Cutter 





















Figure 12.   Customs and Border Patrol Craft; left – Safe Boat (used by USCG 










Figure 13.   Cyclone-class PC boat                                                                                                    






























Figure 16.   Vertical Take-off UAVs (VTUAV); left – USCG HV-911 Eagle Eye; 
 right – Navy MQ-8B Fire Scout 
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